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THE LEGACY OF THE NORTH CAPE SPILL:
A NEW LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR THE TUG
AND BARGE INDUSTRY
Dennis Nixon* Elise Golden" and Louise Kane***
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of law is not a smooth, linear process. Theories are
developed and laws are drafted in response to particular events. Without
a truly galvanizing incident, sheer inertia favors the status quo. Oil
pollution law is a classic example of event-driven legislation. The loss of
the early supertanker Torrey Canyon in 1967 led to the Intervention
Convention,' which clarified a nation-state's rights to defend itself from a
vessel leaking oil.2 The rust-bucket Argo Merchant, lost on Nantucket
Shoals in 1977, created the impetus to give the Coast Guard greater
regulatory powers over tank vessels through the Port and Tanker Safety
Act3 the following year. The loss of the enormous supertanker Amoco
Cadiz in 1978, while the vessel's master and salvors were arguing over the
* Dennis Nixon is Graduate Program Director and Professor of Marine Affairs at the
University of Rhode Island. He testified before the Rhode Island Senate Special Commis-
sion and the U.S. Senate Committee on the Environment which conducted hearings in the
aftermath of the spill. He also served as a consultant to U.S. Attorney Sheldon Whitehouse
in the prosecution of the case.
** Elise Golden was a Rhode Island Senate Fellow in the Fiscal and Policy Office and
worked on the state's legislative response while earning a Masters degree in Marine Affairs
at the University of Rhode Island. She is currently an oil spill consultant based in Kodiak,
Alaska.
*** Louise Kane was a Rhode Island Senate Fellow in the Fiscal and Policy Office and
worked on the state's legislative response while earning a Masters degree in Marine Affairs
at the University of Rhode Island. She is currently a Knauss Sea Grant Fellow at NOAA
headquarters in Maryland.
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1471 (1996).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1472 (1996).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (1996).
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terms of the salvage agreement, led to a restructuring of the internationally
accepted Lloyd's Open Form Salvage Agreement.4 Finally, the dramatic
loss of the Exxon Valdez in 1989 created the political environment that
made the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),5 our nation's
most encompassing oil spill liability legislation, a reality.
Despite OPA's "great leap forward" in 1990, one segment of the oil
transportation business remained largely unregulated: the tug and barge
industry. It took the loss of the barge North Cape and its towboat Scandia
to bring this under-regulation to public attention and to create the impetus
for major changes in both state and federal law.
A. The Grounding of the North Cape
The facts of this case are a chilling reminder of the old adage that "if
something can go wrong, it will."'6 On January 19, 1996, the tug Scandia
was en route to Providence, Rhode Island, towing the 340-foot, unmanned,
single-hulled barge, North Cape.7 The barge was laden with four million
gallons of No. 2 fuel oil which were intended to replenish diminished
home-heating oil reserves in Providence, Rhode Island. Inbound from
Bayonne, New Jersey, the tug and barge faced dramatically deteriorating
weather conditions. A fierce winter storm was raging on Long Island
Sound, with near blizzard conditions; seas were reported at fifteen feet and
winds of 30-50 knots were blowing from the southeast.8 The National
Weather Service (NWS) had predicted both the intensity and the time of the
storm's arrival for several days.9
4. Miller, A., Lloyd's Standard Form ofSalvage Agreement- 'LOF 80'-A Commentary,
12 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 243 (1981).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-27611 (1996).
6. MURPHY'S LAW.
7. An excellent technical review of this casualty can be found in North Cape Grounding
Caused by Fire, Weather, Anchoring Problems, PROF. MARINER, April-May 1998, at 48-52.
The Providence Journal Bulletin, the state's newspaper of record, has collected all of its
coverage of the spill and its aftermath on a special web site: <http://www. projo.com/
horizons/oilspill>.
8. Tom Morgan, Tug, Oil Barge Go Aground, PROVIDENCEJ.-BULL. Jan. 20, 1996, at Al.
9. S. Brautigam, Oil Spills-How Criminal Penalties May Apply in Marine Oil Spills,
PROF. MARINER, June-July 1998, at 58.
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At midday, with the flotilla" just five miles from "turning the comer"
northwards into the more protected waters of Narragansett Bay, fire broke
out in the Scandia's engine room." Alerted by the tug's general alarm
system, the six-man crew attempted, unsuccessfully, to fight the fire with
three portable carbon dioxide extinguishers, but were prevented from doing
so by the intense heat and smoke.'2 At 1:57 p.m., the Captain radioed a
distress call to the Coast Guard, reporting that his vessel was ablaze and
that he intended to abandon ship.
3
Just forty-five minutes later, a forty-four foot patrol boat from Coast
Guard Station Point Judith arrived on the scene. 4 Huddled on the bow in
their survival suits, the crew of the Scandia awaited rescue.'5 Sea condi-
tions made it impossible for the patrol boat to come alongside the blazing
tug; the crew leapt into frigid Rhode Island Sound and were helped aboard
the patrol boat by a Coast Guard rescue swimmer who subsequently had to
be helped out of the water himself.'6
After a quick return to Point Judith to drop off most of the crew, the
patrol boat returned to the scene at 4:45 p.m. with the Scandia's mate and
engineer."7 With the Scandia disabled and no other tug in range for a
rescue, they planned to lower North Cape's anchor and hope that it held
before the barge ran aground. Their plan was bold, courageous, and
perhaps foolhardy. If they had been successful, they would have been
hailed as heroes. The patrol boat cautiously approached the North Cape,
and at just the right moment the two men, still clad in their survival suits,
jumped aboard.
Unfortunately, just three weeks before, the tug's anchor windlass' s had
been removed for repairs. The ordinarily simple job of powering the
anchor down was now rendered much more complex. Because the anchor
was both tied in place with heavy nylon rope and shackled with wire rope,
the two men would have to cut the anchor free to be able to deploy it. The
10. Flotilla, from the Spanish diminutive offlota, a fleet, is commonly used to describe
a tug with barge in tow.
11. Morgan, supra note 8.






18. A windlass is a winch used to raise and lower an anchor. See WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEw INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 2620 (1993).
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men jumped aboard, armed only with their knives. With waves breaking
over them, and limited by the lack of tools and the clumsy, three-fingered
survival suits they still wore, they were unable to release the anchor after
nearly an hour of effort.'9 The engineer was able to jump back aboard the
patrol boat, however, the mate decided not to risk the jump. Instead, he
waited an hour before a Coast Guard helicopter, flying at night in a fierce
blizzard, rescued him20
The good news was that no lives would be lost; the bad news was that
the North Cape was now hard aground in a fierce storm.2" Before the night
was over, nine of the barge's sixteen compartments were damaged, and
some 828,000 gallons of oil escaped into Rhode Island Sound before the
remaining cargo could be off-loaded.22
The barge spilled its cargo of No. 2 fuel oil adjacent to the Trustom
Pond National Wildlife Sanctuary and in waters rich with marine life. As
a direct result of the oil spill, over 250 square miles of ocean waters were
quickly closed to commercial fishing. Recent studies conducted as part of
the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process23 estimate that
the oil killed more than 12 million lobsters, 82 million crabs, 679 million
mussels, and 81 million surf clams.24 They also estimate that between
2,842 and 5,559 ducks, loons, cormorants and other sea birds died.
Several coastal ponds, the nursery grounds for coastal fisheries, were also
affected. Because No. 2 heating oil is a highly refined product, and
because the wind and wave action was so intense on the night of the spill,
cleanup efforts had more of a psychological than physical impact.26 The oil
quickly mixed into the water column, increasing its toxic impact and
minimizing the effectiveness of traditional oil spill skimming equipment.27
19. PROF. MARINER, supra note 7, at 50.
20. Id.
21. Id.at50-51.
22. See Peter Lord, Leaking Oil Spreads 12 Miles, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Jan. 22,
1996, at Al.
23. This issue is being hotly disputed by experts hired by the Responsible Party, Eklof
Marine. Gary Mauseth of Peak Consultants, Inc., stated "[r]epresentation to an unsophisti-
cated reader that this modeling effort yields an accurate and precise estimate of injury is
misleading, to say the best." Peter Lord, Estimate of Losses from Oil Spill is Growing,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan. 8, 1998, at Al.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Oil recovery efforts are most successful in calm seas with unrefined oils. See
generally AMERICAN SOC'Y OF ENGINEERS, OIL SPILLS (Spaulding & Reed eds., 1990).
27. Peter Lord, Grounded Barge Leaks 700,000 Gallons of Heating Oil, PROVIDENCE
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The North Cape was repaired and floated free on January 26, 1996.28
The Scandia, hard aground on Moonstone Beach, could not be extricated
until February 13, 1996.29
This Article was completed exactly two years after the North Cape
spill occurred on January 19, 1996. Section II will discuss the resulting
criminal charges and the criminal penalties assessed on the defendants.
The enormously complex Natural Resources Damage Assessment
(NRDA)3" has not been completed, nor have the civil actions filed by
fishermen and others affected by the spill been resolved.31 It will likely be
years before either issue is fully settled, particularly because this was the
first spill to utilize the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
(NOAA) NRDA regulations, promulgated just two weeks before the spill
occurred on January 5, 1996.32 However, the spill's real legacy is not in the
details of the civil liability litigation, but in the legislative and regulatory
response at the state and federal level to the glaring deficiencies in tug and
barge safety regulatiohis. Section I will examine these responses in detail,
with a particular emphasis on the process used to move the safety agenda
forward.
II. LEGAL REPERCUSSIONS
A. Criminal Charges Resulting from the North Cape
Investigators descended upon the site of the spill almost immediately.33
The University of Rhode Island, known for its marine programs and located
3.-BULL., Jan. 20, 1996, at Al.
28. See Tom Mooney and B. Jones, North Cape Pulled Free From Site ofDevastation,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan. 27, 1996, at Al.
29. See J. Beardsworht, BeachedScandiaSet Free atLast, PROVIDENcEJ.-BULL., Feb.
13, 1996, at Al.
30. The computer modeling of the scientific assessment is so complex, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration scheduled atwo-day training program in February,
1998 for individuals who wanted to learn how the scientists arrived at their estimates of oil
spill damage. See Peter Lord, Meeting Set to Explain Computer Data, PROVIDENCE J.-
BuLL., Jan. 8, 1998, at A7.
31. More than 600 fishermen and businesses hurt by the spill still have claims pending
against Eklof as of this article's submission date. Tom Mooney and Zachary Malinowski,
Owner of North Cape Barge Agrees to Pay $9.5 Million, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Jan. 10,
1998, at Al.
32. 60 Fed. Reg. 440 (1996).
33. Lord, supra note 22, at 5.
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just a few miles from the spill site, sent teams of students and faculty to
measure the spill's size and toxicity, assist in the cleanup effort, and
measure its economic impact on the state's key tourism and fishing
industries. Meanwhile, teams from the Coast Guard, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
the National Transportation Safety Board, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Attorney's Office,
The Rhode Island Attorney General's Office, the Coastal Resources
Management Council, and the Department of Environmental Management
all responded in accordance with their respective legislative mandates.'
On another front, discussed in Section III of this article, legislators at both
state and federal levels convened hearings to evaluate the effectiveness of
the current regulatory system.3" No stone would be left unturned.
From the outset, most of the attention was given to the NRDA process,
commissioning a wide range of studies, and the lawsuits filed by commer-
cial fishermen, many of whom relied upon charity for their basic needs
while fishing grounds were closed. The general public understood that the
cleanup would cost millions, and that the civil damages would be even
greater,36 but did not realize that the facts leading up to the spill might lead
to criminal charges.37 However, as one experienced maritime practitioner
recently observed: "One of the hallmarks of recent pollution legislation is
the reinvigoration of the criminal aspects of such conduct. This approach
holds that both individuals and their corporations are, more than ever,
prime targets in a pollution criminal prosecution. '38
Although gross negligence was recognized for many years as providing
the basis for criminal liability, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 made it a
crime to negligently discharge oil into or upon the navigable waters or
contiguous zone of the United States, in such quantities as may be
harmful.39 With that in mind, U.S. Attorney Sheldon Whitehouse took the
34. Peter B. Lord, Special Report: Oil in the Water, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan. 28,
1996, sec. B.
35. See Tom Mooney, Senate Commission Opens Hearings on Preventing Spills,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 3, 1996, at 1; see also Committee Grills Coast Guard Over
Delay in New Safety Rules, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 15, 1996, at B 1.
36. As of this date, Eklof has spent more than $10 million to clean up the spill and to
compensate some of the fishermen and businesses damaged by it. Lord, supra note 23.
37. Mooney and Malinowski, supra note 31.
38. Francis J. Gonyor, Dangerous Waters Without a Chart: Pollution Problems as They
Relate to Tugs and Barges, 70 TUL. L. REV. 549, 558 (1995).
39. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(3); 1319(c)(1)(A) (1996).
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lead in a coordinated, federal-state criminal investigation which, over 18
months, quietly built a case against the corporations which owned the tug
and barge, the President of Eklof Marine, Leslie Wallin, and the skipper of
the Scandia, Gregory Aitken.
On September 25, 1997, Whitehouse called a press conference to
announce that he had filed a 15-page Criminal Information against thethree
corporations, Wallin, and Aitken, alleging violations of the Oil Pollution
Act.' the Refuse Act,41 and the Federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act42 in U.S.
District Court.43 At the same time, Rhode Island Attorney General Jeffrey
Pine announced the filing of a Criminal Information against the corporate
defendants for violation of the Rhode Island Pollution Control Act." The
headline news was ihat all of the parties agreed to plead guilty to all of the
charges, and pay a total of $9.5 million in criminal fines and other costs.4'
1. The Federal Criminal Information
The bulk of the federal Criminal Information was devoted to the charge
of negligent discharge of oil under the Oil Pollution Act.4 6 The U.S.
Attorney cited four specific areas of negligent behavior: a) the weather
forecast; b) the missing anchor windlass; c) firefighting equipment; and d)
fire hazards aboard the Scandia.
a. The Weather Forecast
Several days before the two vessels began their voyage in Bayonne,
New Jersey, a severe winter storm had been predicted for the waters off the
coast of Rhode Island. Fleet Weather Service, a private weather service
under contract with'the defendant, Eklof, to provide weather information,
40. Id.
41. 33 U.S.C. §§ 407,411(1996).
42. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703,707(a) (1996).
43. News Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorney Sheldon Whitehouse, Eklof
Marine to Admit Criminal Liability in North Cape Spill, Will Pay $8.5 Million, (Sept. 25,
1997).
44. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.5-3 (1996).
45. Peter Lord, Tug Owner Agrees to Pay $9.5 Million for North Cape Spill,
PROVIDENCE J.-BYLL., Sept. 26, 1997, at 1.
46. Because there have been relatively few criminal prosecutions under the law, the
degree of negligence alleged is useful to document for future applications of the law.
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faxed storm warnings to both Eklof Marine headquarters and to the
defendant, Aitken, aboard the Scandia on January 19, 1996.4' By noon that
day, all of the vessels in Eklof s fleet that were in the vicinity of New York
Harbor, Long Island Sound, and Rhode Island Sound, with the exception
of the Scandia and the North Cape, reported to Eklof that they had gone
"weatherbound;" that is, they remained in safe harbor to wait out the
storm.48 When Scandia Captain Gregory Aitken was asked by U.S. District
Court Judge Mary Lisi at the sentencing hearing why he alone chose to be
at sea that day, he responded, "I thought I could outrun the storm[.]" 49
b. The Missing Anchor Windlass
One of the most remarkable facts disclosed by the investigation was
that the North Cape left the safety of Bayonne harbor and headed into a
fierce winter storm without its anchor windlass and steel anchor cable. The
windlass had broken and been removed for repair several weeks prior.
Defendant Leslie Wallin, Eklof s shoreside manager, directed the crew to
use a shackle, wire, and rope to create a makeshift rigging to hold the
anchor in place.50 The steel anchor cable was replaced with polypropylene
rope, which may or may not have had the tensile strength to hold the barge
even if the anchor was successfully deployed.5' As discussed earlier,
despite the valiant efforts of two crew members, they could not release the
anchor under the conditions when it was most needed: adrift, and ap-
proaching a lee shore. Without the option of dropping anchor in a safe
harbor, defendant Gregory Aitken, the Captain of the Scandia, had no other
option but to press on through the storm - unlike every other vessel in the
Eklof fleet that day which had successfully anchored and waited out the
bad weather. Although the Coast Guard did not require vessels to carry an
operable anchor system aboard, the Criminal Information alleged that it was
negligent to leave port without one, particularly in those weather condi-
tions.5 2
47. Criminal Information for United States of America v. Eklof Marine, et al. at 5-6,
(Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Eklof Information].
48. Id. at 5-7.
49. Mooney and Malinowski, supra note 31.
50. Eklof Information, at 7-9.
51. Id. at 7-8.
52. Id. at 10.
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c. Firefighting Equipment
This was not the first time a fire had occurred aboard the Scandia. The
investigation revealed that on March 5, 1995, an engine room fire ignited
while the Scandia was docked in New Haven, Connecticut.53 Remarkably,
the Captain at the time reported that the crew was only able to extinguish
the fire after borrowing firefighting suits and self-contained breathing
apparatus from the New Haven Fire Department.' 4 In his report on this
incident, the Captain recommended that such equipment be required for the
vessel in the future; his recommendation was not followed."
The Scandia was not equipped with a remotely operated fire suppres-
sion system, which has become the industry standard for vessels of this size
and class.56 Remote switches are typically located on the bridge and the
crew quarters, where they can be quickly activated when the fire alarm
sounds.57 Such a system would have automatically shut off all fuel and
ventilation leading to the engine room, and would have flooded the engine
room with an inert gas, such as carbon dioxide.58
Thus, the Criminal Information alleged that Eklof, Wallin, and Thor
were negligent for failing to have either an operable, automatic firefighting
system or the appropriate equipment to make manual firefighting possible.59
d. Fire Hazards Aboard the Scandia
The Criminal Information also alleged that there were several condi-
tions aboard the Scandia, resulting directly from the negligence of Eklof
and Thor, that contributed to the severity of the fire: 1) Eklof had no
preventive maintenance program; 2) Eklof did not maintain records of the
maintenance and repairs it performed; 3) Oily gloves and oily rags were
kept in a plastic milk crate on a wooden cabinet located in the engine room.
The unsecured cabinet fell over at some point, contributing either to the
risk of fire or the flames; 4) A clothes dryer located in the engine room




56. Id. at 11.
57. Eklof Information at 11.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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continuously unless manually turned off; 5) For several months, crew
members complained of receiving electrical shocks while aboard the
Scandia. The source of the electrical shocks was never diagnosed or
repaired; and 6) Contrary to Coast Guard requirements, the engine room
door was generally left open during vessel operation. Saltwater entering
the engine room and coming into contact with electrical components can
cause a short circuit, leading to a fire.'
The cumulative impact of all of the above, in the view of the U.S.
Attorney, was more than enough to demonstrate that the defendants had
"negligently discharged oil" under the terms of the Oil Pollution Act.6"
Count II of the Information, under the Refuse Act, simply alleged that the
defendants had "deposited refuse matter, namely 828,000 gallons of No. 2
heating oil, from a ship, the Barge North Cape, into... navigable waters." 62
Count I, under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, alleged that the defendants
"did kill migratory birds."
63
2. The State Criminal Information
The one page Rhode Island criminal information announced at the
same time charged Eklof Marine, Thor Towing, and Odin Marine with a
violation of the Rhode Island Oil Pollution Act, §§ 46-12.5-10 and 46-12.5-
10 of the Rhode Island General Laws. The maximum statutory penalties
for violation of the law are a fine of $25,000 per day or imprisonment for
not more than five years, or both.
3. The Resulting Plea Agreement
At the same time the criminal charges were announced, the corporate
defendants agreed to plead guilty to all three counts of the federal Criminal
Information and the one count of the state Criminal Information for
60. Id.
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id.
63. Id. Loons, common eiders, goldeneyes, mergansers, buffleheads, homed grebes,
red-necked grebes, and herring gulls were all found on the beach after the spill. Id. at 4.
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violation of the Rhode Island Oil Pollution Act.64 Aitken and Wallin,
charged only under the Oil Pollution Act, pled guilty as well.65
The Plea Agreement with the corporate defendants was rather
complex.' First, they agreed to pay a fine of $3.5 million for violation of
the federal laws: $100,000 for violation of the Oil Pollution Act, $400,000
for violation of the Refuse Act; and, $3,000,000 for violation of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Under the terms of the Migratory Bird law, the
latter amount would be appropriated to the Department of the Interior to
carry out approved wetlands conservation projects.67 Further, they agreed
that payment of the criminal fine in no way affected any civil liability
action from any federal, state, local, or private party, particularly the
NRDA under OPA. The defendants also agreed to be placed on probation
for three years, with a special condition that the following remedial
measures be taken for all of their vessels which pass within 12 miles of the
Rhode Island coast:
1. Defendants will use only barges with operable anchor systems,
which include a working anchor windlass.
2. Defendants will equip all of their self-propelled vessels with
safe and effective, remote-controlled fire suppression systems and
will properly train all crew members in their safe and proper
operation.
3. Defendants will equip all of their vessels with at least two
SCBAs (self-contained breathing apparatus) and at least two
firefighting suits, and will properly train all crew members in their
safe and effective use.
4. Defendant will cease use of unmanned, single-hulled oil
barges.68
Compliance with the agreement will be monitored by an independent
consultant, approved by the government; if they fall to comply with the
conditions above, they will be subject to an additional $1 million fine.69
64. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Eklof, Thor, Odin, at 1.
65. See PleaAgreement, United States v. Gregory Aitken, at 1; Plea Agreement, United
States v. Leslie Wallin, at 1.
66. See Mooney & Malinowski, supra note 31.
67. American Wetlands Conservation Act § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 4406(b) (1996).
68. Plea Agreement, supra note 64, at 6.
69. See Mooney & Malinowski, supra note 31.
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One of the unusual aspects of this plea agreement is that beyond the
criminal fines, the defendants "volunteered" to donate an additional $1.5
million to the Nature Conservancy.7" The money will be used to acquire
ecologically significant property in the immediate vicinity of the oil spill
along Rhode Island's South Shore.7'
Finally, the corporate defendants also agreed to pay a $3.5 million
criminal fine to the State of Rhode Island for violation of the state oil spill
law.72 The net result was an agreement to pay a total of $8.5 million, with
a potential for a further payment of $1 million if terms of the probation
agreement are not followed. That makes it the largest criminal fine paid in
Rhode Island history, the largest environmental fine in New England
history, and the third largest oil spill fine ever assessed, according to U.S.
Attorney Whitehouse.73 Douglas Eklof, representing Eklof Marine, stated:
"We accept responsibility for the event and believe that the process which
resulted in today's agreement has been fair and appropriate."'74
The plea agreement for the corporate defendants was accepted by the
court at its sentencing hearing on January 9, 1998." Attorneys for the
corporate defendants, after handing over checks for $3.5 million in both the
U.S. District Court and the Rhode Island Superior Court, asserted that
Eklof has substantially upgraded the forty vessels in its fleet since the
incident in question, and was "90% in compliance" with the terms of the
probation by the sentencing date.76 Captain George Ireland, a retired Coast
Guard officer and former Captain of the Port of Providence, was appointed
by the Federal District Court to supervise the terms of the probation
regarding the upgrading of their equipment and training.77
The sentencing of the individual defendants, Aitken and Wallin,
involved the possibility of prison terms for both. However, U.S. District
Court Judge Mary Lisi accepted the recommendation of the U.S. Attorney's
70. The Nature Conservancy is a national, not-for-profit organization whose mission
is to protect ecologically significant sites through land conservation. See Plea Agreement,
supra note 64, at 8.
71. See Mooney & Malinowski, supra note 31.
72. Id.
73. See News Release, supra note 43, at 2.
74. Lord, supra note 45.
75. See Mooney & Malinowski, supra note 31.
76. Oral remarks of Thomas J. Kelly, Counsel for Defendants Eklof Marine, Thor
Towing, and Odin Marine at Sentencing Hearing before Federal District Court Judge Mary
Lisi, Providence, Rhode Island (Oct. 6, 1997).
77. Personal Communication from Assistant U.S. Attorney Ira Belkin to Dennis Nixon
at Sentencing Hearing, (Oct. 6, 1997).
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Office and placed both on probation.7" In addition, she imposed a personal
criminal fine on Captain Aitken in the amount of $10,000, and a substantial
$100,000 for part owner and corporate officer Wallin, who headed Eklof
Marine's vessel maintenance program." Aitken, Wallin, and Douglas
Eklof, representing the corporate defendants, all gave personal apologies
to the court, the people of Rhode Island, and in particular to the fishermen
whose livelihoods were disturbed for so long."
U.S. Attorney Whitehouse, who spearheaded the multi-agency criminal
investigation by the federal and state governments, concluded the day with
the following statement:
These fines are the largest imposed ever for an oil spill within the
continental United States. They serve notice on oil polluters that
our land and water are precious and that fouling them has a heavy
price. As Judge Lisi correctly noted, this is a 'wake-up call for the
industry.' We expect this will raise the standard of safety for the
oil transportation industry."
III. THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY RESPONSE
To THE NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL
Just days after the North Cape grounded, the Rhode Island General
Assembly initiated a legislative response to the spill which would quickly
spread to involve neighboring New England states, the tug and barge
industry, the U.S. Coast Guard, and Congress. What began as a prevent-
able marine casualty in the coastal waters of the smallest state soon became
a major focusing event for regulating the safety of towing vessel and tank
barge safety regulations. The initial response began in 1996 in the Rhode
Island Statehouse with the introduction of a groundbreaking oil spill
prevention bill. Within two years, the Rhode Island legislative response to
the North Cape spill expanded to include three separate bills in U.S.
Congress, 2 several state-level legislative initiatives, 3 numerous hearings
78. See Mooney & Malinowski, supra note 31.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. News Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney Sheldon Whitehouse,
Eklof Fined $7,000,00for North Cape Oil Spill, (January 9, 1997) at 2.
82. Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1996, H.R. 4982, 104th Cong. (1996); Barge Safety
Act of 1996, H.R. 3014, 104th Cong. (1996); Oil Spill Prevention and Response
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by state legislatures and Congressional committees," and the formation of
a Regional Risk Assessment Team. 5 Ultimately, elements of each of these
responses to the North Cape were incorporated into an October, 1997 Coast
Guard proposed rule;86 as a result the regulatory impacts of the Rhode
Island North Cape spill became national in scope.
A. The Rhode Island Legislative Response
1. The Special Senate Commission
Even as the Scandia and North Cape lay grounded off Moonstone
Beach, Rhode Island's political leadership had begun to consider whether
the state would respond to the oil spill and how it could do so.8 7 Conse-
quently, on January 23, 1996, Rhode Island Senate Majority Leader Paul
S. Kelly convened a Special Senate Commission to investigate the events
which led up to the North Cape oil spill, and to identify measures to
prevent future spills in Rhode Island waters.88 The Special Senate Commis-
sion (Commission) investigating the North Cape Oil Spill was composed
of eight members, and was chaired by State Senator Domenic DiSandro.8 9
This bipartisan committee conducted several investigative hearings focused
Improvement Act, S. 1730, 104th Cong. (1996).
83. In February, 1996, the Connecticut legislature introduced An Act Concerning
Pilotage and Safety Requirements for Certain Tank Vessels, Conn. Raised bill no. 365
(1996). On April 8, 1996, the Massachusetts Governor William R. Weld introduced a bill
into the Massachusetts General Assembly entitled An Act Establishing Safety Requirements
for Tank Barges. HB No. 5938, to amend Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 21 (1996). Neither bill was
enacted.
84. In addition to the Rhode Island Senate hearings and the U.S. Senate Committee on
the Environment and Public Works hearings discussed in this text, both the Massachusetts
and Connecticut state legislatures held hearings on the bills described in the previous note.
85. In June, 1996 the U.S. Coast Guard First District formed a Quality Action Regional
Risk Assessment Team, consisting of industry, government, and environmental organization
representatives from the New England coastal states.
86. Towing Vessel Safety, 62 Fed, Reg. 52,057 (1997) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. §
155, 46 C.F.R. §§ 25, 27, and 32) (proposed Oct. 6, 1997).
87. ELISE E. GOLDEN, RHODE ISLAND SENATE BRIEF, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE
NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL, (Jan. 22, 1996).
88. RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N INVESTIGATING THE IMPLICATIONS OFTHE
NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL, FINAL REPORT (1996).
89. At the time of the North Cape spill, Senator DiSandro represented the coastal
Rhode Island communities of Narragansett and South Kingstown, and many of his
constituents were commercial fishermen.
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on identifying the causes of the oil spill and evaluating the effectiveness of
state-level response to the spill.9° The information gathered through these
hearings was to be used by the Commission members to determine whether
the state should take legislative action to protect the state against the threat
of future oil spills.91
The Commission conducted a series of three investigative hearings.
The first of these hearings occurred on February 2, 1996 at the Rhode
Island Statehouse in Providence, where testimony was provided by repre-
sentatives of state and federal agencies, and by members of the academic
community.92 The first hearing was well-attended, and was covered
extensively by the local media.93 After opening remarks by Senator
DiSandro, testimony was prekented by the first panel of witnesses from the
Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (RIDEM).94
RIDEM Director Tim Keeney coordinated the testimony of several
attorneys for the Department and personnel who were involved with the on-
scene response to the North Cape spill. The RIDEM testimony skirted the
issue of damage assessment, noting that with litigation pending, no
affirmative statements about natural resource damages could be made.9'
Instead, the testimony provided by RIDEM was primarily descriptive,
recounting the protocol followed during the response effort.96
The RIDEM testimony was followed by the testimony of U.S. Con-
gressman Jack Reed who, together with Congressman Patrick Kennedy,7
reintroduced the Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1996 (TVSA) into the House
of Representatives on February 1, 1996.98 The TVSA contained safety
90. RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88.
91. See id. at 2-3.
92. Faculty members from the University of Rhode Island (U.R.I.) and the Graduate
School of Oceanography at U.R.I. were invited to testify throughout the hearing process
regarding issues within their respective areas of expertise.
93. Local television news crews representing all three of the major networks dispatched
cameras to the first hearing. In addition, press coverage was extensive in the Providence
newspaper as well as in other local papers. See, e.g., Tom Mooney, Senate Commission
Opens Hearings on Preventing Spills, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Jan. 29, 1996, at Al; State
Weighs Tougher Shipping Regulations, NEWPORT DAILY NEWS, Jan. 29, 1996, at Cl.
94. RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 19-20.
95. See id at 20.
96. 1a
97. Congressmen Kennedy and Reed both represented the State of Rhode Island in the
U.S.,House of Representatives. In the November 1996 election, Congressman Reed
successfully ran for the U.S. Senate seat of retiring Senator Claiborne Pell.
98. Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1996, H.R. 4982, 104th Cong. (1996). In 1993 and
1994, identical legislation had been introduced by Massachusetts Congressman Gerry
1999]
224 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:209
equipment requirements and personnel standards for uninspected towing
vessels operating in U.S. waters, and would have required basic safety and
navigational equipment aboard vessels such as the Scandia. In his testi-
mony, Congressman Reed stated that the Towing Vessel Safety Act was
only the first step, and that there was room for the state to proceed with its
own course of action to further strengthen the regulatory framework
governing vessels which transport oil through state waters.99
Several other individuals, representing diverse interests ranging from
oil spill cleanup contractors to non-profit environmental groups, testified
at the February 2 hearing."l° However, it was a Marine Affairs Professor
from the University of Rhode Island who provided the testimony which
effectively focused the legislative efforts of the Special Senate Commis-
sion. " ' In his testimony, Professor Dennis Nixon posed three questions for
the legislators to consider in designing their response to the oil spill: 1) why
did the Scandia leave port in the face of a well-forecasted winter storm;' °2
2) why was the Scandia not equipped with a fire suppression system which
could be remotely deployed from the wheelhouse or galley;'0 3 and 3) why
should an unmanned, single-hulled tank barge, with an inoperable anchor
system, be permitted to carry millions of gallons of oil through state
waters."° In his discussion of this final point, Nixon noted that although
the operating conditions of the tug and barge seemed intuitively unsafe,
neither the Scandia nor the North Cape were in violation of a single federal
law. 5 The sum effect of Nixon's testimony focused the attention of the
Studds, however neither bill ever made it through Congress.
99. RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 21. This is an
important statement because the issue of preemption arose repeatedly in the context of the
Rhode Island state-level legislative response to the spill. The Senator's statement indicated
that he did not intend his towing vessel safety bill to preempt the state's right to proceed
along their own legislative course of action.
100. Id. at 21-24.
101. Interview by Elise Golden with Domenic DiSandro and Charles Fogarty, Rhode
Island State Senators, in Providence, R.I. (Feb. 3, 1996).
102. The weather forecast for several days prior to the Scandia 's departure indicated that
a violent storm would hit southern New England on January 19, 1996. See earlier textual
discussion of circumstances surrounding North Cape spill. See Morgan, supra note 8.
103. The Scandia had, in fact, suffered a severe engine fire less than one year previous
to the Rhode Island spill. See Elizabeth Abbott, Grounded Tug Has Seen Bottom Before,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Jan. 25, 1996, at C1.
104. RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 22.
105. Professor Nixon, in his testimony, noted that while the Coast Guard has safety
regulations mandating operable anchors aboard most pleasure craft, no such requirement
exists for the tank barges which haul millions of gallons of oil through our coastal waters.
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Commission on several key regulatory issues, including double hull
requirements for tank barges, requirements for operable anchor systems
aboard tank vessels, personnel considerations such as placing crew aboard
a tank barge to deploy an anchor in the event that a tug is disabled, and
ensuring that fire suppression systems may be remotely accessed aboard
towing vessels."
Professor Nixon also suggested, in his testimony, that the Coast Guard
consider redesignating the waters of Block Island Sound as "offshore"
rather than "inland" waters. In inland waters, vessels may be more heavily
loaded so that they sit deeper in the water with less freeboard.1' 7 Vessels
that travel through offshore waters are required to carry less cargo so that
they have a higher level of reserve buoyancy.0 8 Professor Nixon asserted
that if the Coast Guard were to change the designation of Block Island
Sound, vessels that transit Rhode Island waters would be prepared for an
open-ocean journey and be better able to react to the harsh winter storms
and high sea states which are so common in these waters.' °9 This sugges-
tion, too, was incorporated into the legislative package designed by the
Senate Commission.' At the completion of the first hearing, the Rhode
Island legislators had effectively focused their efforts on creating stricter
safety standards for towing vessels and tank barges transporting oil through
state waters."'
The second investigative hearing conducted by the Special Senate
Commission occurred on February 7,1996. The testimony presented at this
hearing focused on the identification and quantification of the environmen-
tal and economic impacts of the spill. The Executive Director of the Rhode
Island Economic Development Corporation testified regarding efforts to
provide short and long-term financial relief for individuals and businesses
who had suffered losses as a result of the North Cape oil spill."2 Represen-
tatives of the lobster industry and shellfish aquaculture industry testified
regarding the anticipated effects of the spill on local fisheries, especially
Nixon stated that he found it alarming that no such mandatory anchor regulation exists for
tank barges. ld.
106. RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 23.
107. Id at 22-23.
108. Id. at 23.
109. Id.
110. S.J. 96-S 3300, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996).
111. Interview by Elise Golden with Domenic DiSandro and Charles Fogarty, Rhode
Island State Senators, in Providence, R.I. (Feb. 3, 1996).
112. RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 25.
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the inshore lobster fishery. "3 Testimony was provided by a representative
of NOAA regarding the NRDA process.11 4 A Dean from the Graduate
School of Oceanography at the University of Rhode Island also read
testimony regarding the various North Cape-related research endeavors
which faculty had undertaken since the spill occurred. "5
The second hearing of the Special Commission helped to identify
several additional issues related to the North Cape spill, such as the need
for a uniform protocol for determining whether oiled seafood is safe for
human consumption, and the need to provide short-term economic relief for
fishermen when oil spills impact fishing grounds." 6 However, by the time
the second Commission hearing had begun, the Senate staff had already
drafted an outline of what was to become the state's legislative response to
the North Cape spill." 7 In fact, Senator DiSandro opened the second
hearing by announcing that in response to the testimony presented at the
first hearing, the Commission had identified three major directives." 8 The
first two legislative actions proposed by the Commission were both
memorializations to the U.S. Congress; one calling for passage of the
Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1996, and the other asking that the Coast
Guard change the designation of Rhode Island Sound from inland to
offshore waters. The third legislative initiative was to revise state oil spill
laws to address safety standards and operating procedures within the
coastal tug and tank barge industry." 9
The legislative agenda thus established, the third hearing of the Special
Senate Commission focused on identifying specific safety measures and
strategies to incorporate into the impending state legislation. 2 ' Mr. Josh
Fenton, a lobbyist from RIDEM, presented several suggestions for regula-
113. The North Cape spill caused massive die-offs of juvenile lobster populations. It is
estimated that the impact of the North Cape lobster kill will be felt for many seasons to
come, due to the large number of juvenile lobsters that washed ashore. See Elizabeth
Abbott, Fishing, Lobster Industries Crippled, PROVIDENCE J.- BULL., Jan. 22, 1996, at A 1.
114. Marguerite Matera testified on behalf of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration regarding the NRDA process. See RHODEISLAND SPECIALSENATECOMM'N,
supra note 88, at 28.
115. Id. at29.
116. Id. at 25-31.
117. Id. at 25.
118. Id.
119 Id.
120. This hearing occurred on February 16, 1997 in the Rhode Island Statehouse.
RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 32-40.
The Legacy of the North Cape Spill
tory and legislative action.'21 Mr. Fenton's testimony set the tone for the
position which RIDEM would assume during the course of the legislative
response. RIDEM' s position, and indirectly the Governor's position, 2 2 was
that any legislative action taken should not overstep the regulatory authority
of the state, and that Rhode Island should not attempt to implement
standards that would cripple the industry responsible for supplying the state
with petroleum products." Mr. Fenton suggested that the state consider
designating traffic lanes for barge traffic, and that tug escorts be considered
as one method of spill prevention, provided they could be acquired at a
reasonable rate to the vessel operator.'24 In his testimony, Mr. Fenton also
indicated that the state should consider designating certain marine areas as
environmentally sensitive or particularly vulnerable to the threats of oil
pollution, and should exclude petroleum-laden vessels from transiting these
areas." Mr. Fenton's testimony presented a stern warning to avoid
unilateral state action, which might lead to an embargo of Rhode Island,
ports by the tug and barge industry.126
Mr. Michael Rubin, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Rhode
Island, testified before the Commission regarding the requirements of OPA,
and the relationship of the federal law to the North Cape spill. Mr. Rubin
focused specifically on the claims process for individuals impacted by the
spill.'27 The Senators questioned Mr. Rubin specifically about the legal
implications of state action in attempting to regulate the tug and barge
industry." Mr. Rubin indicated that as long as a state law or requirement
did not directly conflict with an existing federal standard, it would likely
121. See id. at 32-33.
122. In Rhode Island, the Department of Environmental Management (RIDEM) operates
at the direction of the Executive Office; therefore, Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Almond
has considerable input into policy decisions made by RIDEM. Because Governor Almond
is a member of the Republican party, and both houses of the Rhode Island General Assembly
have a Democratic majority, the relationship between the Executive Office and the state
legislature has been described as adversarial. Interview with Robert Bromley, Rhode Island
Senate Deputy Policy Advisor, (Jan. 1996).
123. Theimplication ofthis statement was that the legislative proposals being considered
by Rhode Island, specifically those which imposed safety standards and equipment
requirements for tugs and barges operating in state waters, represented an improper
expression of state regulatory authority. Interview by Elise Golden with Josh Fenton, Rhode
Island Department of Environmental Management, in Providence, R.I. (Feb. 16, 1996).
124. RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 32-33.
125. See id. at 33.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 34-35.
128. See iL at 35.
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withstand legal challenge. 129 Mr. Rubin also indicated that, contrary to the
assertions of Mr. Fenton, antitrust laws would preclude any industry
embargo of Rhode Island should the state implement stricter safety
requirements.
130
The U.S. Coast Guard was invited to testify at the first hearing of the
Special Commission, but declined this invitation based on advice from the
U.S. Attorney regarding pending investigations and lawsuits.' 3' However,
at the third hearing, Captain of the Port of Providence, Captain Barney
Turlo, United States Coast Guard, did present testimony regarding the role
of the Coast Guard in oil spill response efforts. 131 Captain Turlo also
discussed rulemaking initiatives regarding towing vessel and tank barge
safety, and echoed a statement made by Vice Admiral Henn 3 1 that a set of
final rules for safety requirements aboard U.S. towing vessels would be
issued by the Coast Guard in the summer of 1996.134 Captain Turlo's
testimony suggested that the federal government, through the U.S. Coast
Guard, has singular authority to create and enforce vessel safety standards,
and that state legislative efforts would be best focused elsewhere. '3
A panel of experts from the University of Rhode Island 36 also pre-
sented testimony at the third hearing, as did the Manager of the Trustum
National Wildlife Refuge. 137
129 See id. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 contains specific non-preemption provisions,
which preserve the authority of state governments to impose "additional liability or
requirements with respect to" the discharge of oil or any removal activities. 33 U.S.C. §
2718 (1994).
130. RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 35.
131. See id. at 19.
132. See id. at 36
133. See id. Vice Admiral Henn is the Vice Commandant of the United States Coast
Guard.
134. This rule was issued in final form in July, 1996. Operational Measures to Reduce
Oil Spills from Existing Tank Vessels without Double Hulls, 61 Fed. Reg. 147 (1996) (to
be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 157 and 46 C.F.R. pts. 31 and 35).
135. See RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 36.
136. See id. at 38-39. The panel from U.R.I. included Professor Peter Payton, an
ornithologist and resident expert on seabird ecology, as well as Professor Joseph DeAlteris,
a fisheries biologist who conducted extensive sampling following the spill, testing the level
of hydrocarbons in the seawater and sediments at different time intervals after the oil spill.
137. See id. at 39-40. Charles Hebert, Manager of the Trustum National Wildlife
Refuge, testified regarding environmental damage to the Trustum NWR, parts of which were
severely impacted by the North Cape spill. See id. Mr. Hebert provided detailed testimony
regarding his perception of the impacts of the spilled oil on migratory bird populations, as
well as on other species which inhabit the coastal ponds near Moonstone Beach. See id. at
40.
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During the hearing process, and for many months thereafter, the staff
for the Special Senate Commission conducted extensive research on oil
pollution prevention law and policy, focusing on those statutes and
regulations already in place in other states. 3 ' The results of this research,
combined with the information gleaned through the investigative hearings,
were compiled by the Special Commission staff into a final document
which described the findings of the investigation and outlined the legisla-
tive proposals developed by the Commission based on these findings.'39
The Final Report of the Special Senate Commission Investigating the
North Cape Oil Spill (the Report) contained four major findings. The first
finding concluded that the coastal tug and barge industry as it currently
operated in the United States was highly under-regulated."4' The second
finding asserted that although it is primarily the duty of the United States
Coast Guard to promulgate vessel regulations, there is ample legal prece-
dent to justify the development of aggressive state-level policies to protect
local marine resources from the threat of oil spills.' 4' The Commission's
third finding stated that Rhode Island should follow the example set by
states such as California, Alaska, Wisconsin and Washington, each of
which has enacted aggressive pollution prevention statutes. 42 The fourth
finding by the Commission maintained that any legislation forthcoming
from Rhode Island should not intend to supersede federal law, but should
only serve to protect the state's coastal resources from the threats of oil
138. See id. at 10-14. The approach taken by Rhode Island was modeled in large part
on existing oil spill laws in other states, specifically Washington, Wisconsin, Alaska, and
California. See Robert E. Falvey, A Shot Across the Bow: Rhode Island's Oil Spill
Pollution Prevention and ControlAct, 2 ROGERWILLIAMS U. L. REv. 363,390-399 (1997),
in which the author compares the provisions of Rhode Island's 1996 oil spill legislation to
the Best Achievable Protection Standards, Washington's oil spill prevention regulations.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-020 (1995).
139. See RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 1-15.
140. See id. at 8.
141. See id. at 9-10. The precedents cited in the Final Report include Cooley v. Board
of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. 299 (1981); Kelly v. Washington ex rel.
Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit., 362 U.S. 440
(1960); Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); and Chevron U.S.A. v. Hammond, 726 F. 2d. 483
(1984).
142. RHODEISLAND SPECIALSENATECOMM'N, supra note 88, at 10-14. See supra note
138, regarding the relationship between the components of the Rhode Island oil spill bill and
other state statutes.
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pollution until effective national standards for vessel-source spill preven-
tion are enacted.
4 3
2. Components of the Rhode Island Legislative Package
The legislative package produced in response to the North Cape oil
spill included four pieces of legislation. Two of the bills were memoriali-
zations to U.S. Congress, the first regarding reclassification of Rhode
Island coastal waters as offshore rather than inland,' 44 and the second
urging Congress to pass the Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1996. 4' The
third bill would expand the allowable uses of the Rhode Island Oil Release
Response Fund to provide relief benefits to individuals and industries
severely impacted by an oil spill. 46 These amended uses of the Oil Release
Response Fund would allow for immediate availability of funding for
response efforts, 4 7 and would also fund the development of a Safety
Committee for Narragansett Bay and Long Island Sound. 48 The newly
expanded Fund, capped at $100 million, 149 would be partially financed by
a five cent per barrel tax on all petroleum products entering Rhode Island
ports. 15
0
The Senate Commission leadership characterized these first three
initiatives as integral components of the comprehensive oil spill prevention
strategy designed by the state.' However, the fourth bill drafted by the
Special Commission, The Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act,
was by far the most aggressive and controversial proposal. This bill
contained equipment and manning requirements which exceeded current
federal standards, and these provisions ignited major controversy regarding
the appropriate role of state legislation in oil pollution prevention.
51
143. See id at 14.
144. S.J. 96-S 3300, Jan. Sess. (RI 1996).
145. S.J. 96-S 3301, Jan. Sess. (RI 1996) (Introduced by Rhode Island Congressmen
Jack Reed and Patrick Kennedy, this bill was ultimately absorbed by the Chafee amendments
to the Oil Pollution Act.).
146. S.J. 96-S 3299, Jan. Sess. (RI 1996). See also RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE
COMM'N, supra note 88, at 14.
147. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.7-5.1 (1) (1996).
148. Id. at § 46-12.7-13(2) (1996).
149. Id. at § 46-12.7-4.1(5) (1996).
150. Id. at § 46-12.7-4.1(4) (1996).
151. RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 6.
152. See generally Falvey, supra note 138, at 366, in which the author characterizes the
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3. The Rhode Island Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act"s3
On August 9, 1996, Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Almond signed
into law the Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act (OSPPCA).
The Governor sat at a folding table on Moonstone Beach, near the site
where less than eight months earlier the North Cape lay grounded and
leaking oil." The Governor characterized the new legislation as aggres-
sive in that this law provided tougher safety criteria for the tug and barge
industry than those contaihied in federal law. 5 The enactment of the
OSPPCA was hailed by the Governor as an example for other New England
states to follow."6 Although all individuals in attendance at the signing
ceremony offered strong support for the new Rhode Island law, certain
provisions were publicly criticized by the American Waterways Operators
(AWO), an organization representing the coastal tug and barge industry.
Even RIDEM indicated, in the months following the signing, that they
considered certain provisions of the OSPPCA to be flawed and inappropri-
ate.15
7
Rhode Island legislative response to the North Cape oil spill as a "constitutionally
indefensible, albeit well-intentioned, exercise of Rhode Island's police power." See also
Elise E. Golden & Louise M. Kane, Rhode Island's Legislative Response to the North Cape
Oil Spill: The Expanding Role of State Government in Oil Pollution Prevention, COASTAL
ZONE 97, Abstracts of Presentations 272 (1996) in which the authors discuss the Rhode
Island OSPPCA as a just expression of state regulatory authority and a continuation of a
trend begun in other states.
153. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.5.1-1 et seq. (1996).
154. The signing ceremony was attended by Senators DiSandro and Fogarty, the bills'
two primary supporters, as well as Curt Spaulding, Executive Director of Save the Bay; Tim
Keeney, Director of the Department of Environmental Management; and Dennis Nixon,
Professor of Marine Affairs at the University of Rhode Island and one of the bill's most
vocal supporters. See Christopher Rowland, Drawing a Line in the Sand: Rhode Island
Toughens Oil-Barge Rules, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Aug. 10, 1996, at Al.
155. Id.
156. Id. The signing ceremony, which was well-publicized and was well-attended by
members of the Special Senate Commission and the Department of Environmental
Management, did not betray the fact that the OSPPCA had been highly divisive and
controversial as it moved through the Rhode Island General Assembly, and came very close
to dying in the House of Representatives. Christopher Rowland, HouseApprovesPetroleum
Barge Safety Regulations, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., July 18, 1996, at B4.
157. See Peter Lord, Task Force Set Up to Look at Barge Safety, PROVIDENCEJ.-BuLL.,
June 7, 1996, at B 1. Before the Rhode Island legislation was enacted, AWO, in cooperation
with the Coast Guard, had organized a task force to examine towing vessel and tank barge
safety issues. One of the driving factors behind the formation of this group was the desire,
on the part of the industry, the Coast Guard, and the RIDEM, to develop tug and barge safety
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a. The Intended Function of the OSPPCA
The Rhode Island Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act was
designed as a comprehensive strategy to prevent oil spills by requiring
basic safety equipment and operational standards aboard towing vessels and
tank barges operating in Rhode Island waters. Media accounts based on the
comments of the American Waterways Operators and others who opposed
Rhode Island's aggressive new law characterized these efforts as "knee-
jerk" reactions to the North Cape spill, 58 more punitive than preventative
in nature. However, the intent of the Senate Commission was to develop
a broadly based oil spill prevention strategy which would supplement
current federal regulatory standards. While the North Cape spill served as
the focusing event which spurred public support for state legislative action,
the OSPPCA was designed to be more than a targeted reaction to one
specific pollution event. 5
9
The Rhode Island OSPPCA began by creating a state-level event
reporting requirement, which mandated that all vessel owners or operators
notify the RIDEM in the event of any collision, allision, grounding, or
discharge of oil occurring while a vessel transits state waters. 16° The Act
established personnel policies for vessels operating in state waters, includ-
ing drug and alcohol use prohibitions, and provisions for random testing of
crewmembers for drug and alcohol use.16' The Act also contained record-
keeping provisions, which required maintenance of personnel training and
shipboard drill records aboard all vessels operating in state waters. ' 62
The OSPPCA mandated certain operating procedures for vessels
transiting state waters. These included navigational watch practices, 163 the
preparation of voyage plans,' 64 and technology requirements mandating
certain equipment such as functional radar and global positioning systems
measures which were more acceptable to the industry and the Coast Guard than the Rhode
Island OSPPCA.
158. See Tom Mooney, Panel Proposes StifferBarge Rules, PROVIDENCEJ.-BULL., Feb.
17, 1996, at Al.
159. RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 16.
160. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.5-5 (1996) (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective
June 30, 1997).
161. Id. § 46-12.5-18 (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective June 30, 1997).
162. Id. § 46-12.5-19 (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective June 30, 1997).
163 Id. § 46-12.5-21 (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective June 30, 1997).
164. Id. § 46-12.5-22 (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective June 30, 1997).
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for all towing vessels operating in state waters. 65 The Rhode Island
OSPPCA also created the Narragansett Bay/Rhode Island Sound Safety
Committee.
b. Industry Criticism of the OSPPCA
Of all the components in the OSPPCA, there were four provisions
which evoked the most serious protest from the tug and barge industry.' 67
Indeed, these provisions set off a national debate regarding the delimitation
of state and federal jurisdictional authorities over the maritime petroleum
transportation industry.6 1 The first of these provisions required that as of
June 1, 1997, "no tank vessel shall transport oil or hazardous material on
or over waters of the state in conditions of limited visibility" unless the
tank vessel either possesses a double hull, or is accompanied by an escort
tugboat.' 69 The 1996 OSPPCA also mandated that as of January 1, 2001,
all barges transporting oil through state waters in any weather conditions
must be fitted with a double-hull, unless accompanied by a tug escort. 7 0
This requirement expedited the double-hull requirements for tank vessels
transiting Rhode Island waters beyond the timetable established by that of
165. Id. § 46-12.5-23 (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective June 30, 1997).
166. R.I. GEN. LAWs § 46-12.5-25(5) (1996) (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1,
effective June 30, 1997). The Narragansett Bay/Rhode Island Sound Safety Committee is
an advisory committee charged with planning for and overseeing the safe navigation and
operation of tank vessels in state waters.
167. These protests were most often articulated by spokespeople for the American
Waterways Operators. See e.g. Linda O'Leary, Vice President of Operations for American
Waterways Operators, Statement before the Rhode Island Senate Committee on Judiciary,
Providence, R.I. (May 28, 1996); Thomas Allegretti, President, American Waterways
Operators, Comments to Marine Safety Council, U.S. Coast Guard, regarding Proposed
Rulemaking for Navigation Safety Equipment for Towing Vessels, Coast Guard doe. no. 94-
020 (1996).
168. The State of Washington was involved in a court challenge of its state-level oil spill
prevention law during this time, and this case involved similar issues of preemption and
state-level jurisdictional authority to enact oil spill prevention laws targeting vessel
operations. See International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947
F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
169. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.5-24(a) (1996) (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1,
effective June 30, 1997). It is notable that nowhere in the law is the phrase "limited
visibility" quantified or defined, and that this fact has been cited as potentially complicating
implementation of the regulation by the state.
170. Id. § 46-12.5-24(b).
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OPA.' 71
A second highly controversial component of the OSPPCA required that
tank barges 72 operating in Rhode Island state waters carry two crew-
members aboard the barge at all times. 173 One of the most contentious
provisions of the Rhode Island act simply required that all tank barges
operating in state waters have an operable anchor system which could be
deployed by a crewmember in an emergency situation. 74 This requirement
was so controversial among representatives of the tug and barge industry
that they successfully lobbied to insert a clause which would allow tank
barges to carry "another method of retrieving a lost tow"'75 as an alternative
to the anchor requirement.'76 The final provision of the OSPPCA, which
elicited strong industry protest, required all towing vessels transporting
tank barges through state waters to have on board functioning automated
fire and flood detection and suppression systems which could be activated
by the master or crew in event of an emergency. 77
Despite the controversy surrounding the 1996 Rhode Island OSPPCA,
only a few substantive changes were made to the legislation between May
5, 1996, when the bill was introduced into the Rhode Island Senate, and
August 9, when it was signed into law by the governor. 78 However, certain
171. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 establishes phase-in requirements for double hulls
on tank vessels which would not require double hulls on tank barges in the same class as the
North Cape until 2015. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (1994).
172. The law only applies to those tank barges with capacity of greater than 7500 barrels
ofoil. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.5-21(d) (1996) (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective
June 30, 1997).
173. Id. § 46-12.5-21(b)(ii). At the time the legislation was drafted, there existed no
federal requirement for crewmembers aboard tank barges during normal operations.
Approximately one month after the Rhode Island law was adopted, the Chafee Improvements
to the Oil Pollution Act were signed into law by the President as part of the Coast Guard
Authorization Act. These amendments to OPA require that tank barges carry either two
crewmembers and an operable anchor or a barge retrieval device or comparable safety
system. This new federal regulation still falls short of an actual crew requirement aboard
barges
174. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.5-23.2 (1996) (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective
June 30, 1997).
175. Id. This provision was inserted into the law during final reconciliation of the bill
between the House and Senate versions. The law contains no suggestions for "another
method of retrieving a lost tow."
176. Id.
177. Id. at § 46-12.5-23.1(e). See Linda O'Leary, Vice President of American
Waterways Operators, Statement before the Rhode Island Senate Committee on Judiciary,
Providence, R.I. (1996).
178. Interview with Robert Bromley, Rhode Island Senate Deputy Policy Advisor (Aug.
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provisions in the Rhode Island legislation were softened in response to
industry concerns. 179 For example, the original draft of the bill offered no
phase-in period for double hulls, but required double hulls or tug escorts for
all tank vessels immediately upon enactment of the law, which was to be
January 1, 1997. The Act was amended to push this date back to 2001.
Likewise, criminal penalties for violation of requirements such as event
reporting were included in the original bill, but were omitted from the
version which was signed into law.80 Despite these minor changes to the
bill, the ultimate objective of the Special Senate Commission, to increase
the safety standards which apply to tank vessels transiting Rhode Island
waters, was still satisfied by the newly enacted law.'
4. Formation of the Regional Risk Assessment Team
Before the ink had dried on the 1996 Rhode Island oil spill bill,'82 the
oil industry had initiated efforts to avert legislative action in Rhode Island
and other neighboring states.8 3  Industry representatives repeatedly
asserted, in media accounts and hearing testimony, that despite recent
events the industry had an excellent safety record and that, in any event,
vessel regulation was the exclusive realm of the federal government. 184 The
20, 1996). See also Christopher Rowland, RI Toughens Oil-Barge Rules, PROVIDENCE J.-
BuLL., Aug. 10, 1996, at Al.
179. The OSPPCA easily passed the Rhode Island Senate, where it enjoyed broad-based
support from the Special Senate Commission as well as many members of the Senate
leadership. However, in the House of Representatives, where the bill had fewer vocal
supporters, industry representatives were more successful in their lobbying efforts, and came
close to completely forestalling passage of the legislation. Instead, the AWO successfully
convinced the House Committee which heard the bill to soften certain provisions and
language in the bill. Interview with Robert Bromley, Rhode Island Senate Deputy Policy
Advisor (Aug. 20, 1996).
180. Id.
181. Personal Communication with Robert Bromley (Aug. 20, 1996).
182. Rhode Island Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act, RI 96-S 3304 January
Sess., 1996. This act was signed by Governor Lincoln Almond and passed into law on
August 9, 1996. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 46-12.5-.09 to 12.5-5 and 12.5-18 to 12.5-25 (1996)
(repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective June 30, 1997).
183. See Dennis Nixon, Letterto the Editor, PROVIDENCEJ.-BULL., July 10, 1996. The
letter discusses the public relations barrage against the pending oil spill legislation. It notes
the publication of Thomas Allegretti's (President of American Waterways Operators) July
10, 1996 letter to the Providence Journal-Bulletin and another AWO representative's article
in the Maritime Reporter as evidence of the mounting attacks.
184 See e.g. Linda O'Leary, Vice President of Operations for American Waterways
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American Waterway Operators argued that the industry should be trusted
to self-regulate, and the organization hailed its Safe Carrier Program"5 as
an example of the high safety standards that towing vessel and tank barge
carriers could attain without statutory regulation." 6 Of course, the North
Cape spill and other recent tug and barge casualties have demonstrated that
industry self-regulation is probably not the most effective route to prevent-
ing future spills and casualties. 187 The swift progress of the OSPPCA
Operators, Statement before the Rhode Island Senate Committee on Judiciary, Providence,
R.I. (May 28, 1996); Thomas Allegretti, President, American Waterways Operators,
Comments to Marine Safety Council, U.S. Coast Guard, regarding Proposed Rulemaking for
Navigation Safety Equipment for Towing Vessels, Coast Guard doc. no. 94-020 (1996).
185. The American Waterways Operators Responsible Carriers Program (1996) (on file
with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal). The American Waterways Operators is a
national trade association for the coastal and inland barge and towing industry. AWO
represents owners and operators of tugs and barges from New England to Alaska and
throughout the interior river systems of the United States. The Responsible Carrier Program
was formally adopted as a code of practice by the AWO in December, 1994. A target date
of January 1, 1998 was set for bringing all members into compliance with the Program. The
basic provisions of the program call for the safe and efficient operation of vessels by
complementing and building on existing laws. The Program outlines towing vessel
inspection guidelines, vessel maintenance standards, suggestions for navigation equipment,
environmental controls, boat and barge rigging, tow and retrieval systems, firefighting and
lifesaving equipment and manning, watchstanding and work hour regulations. Each of these
practices is set forth in separate sections of the AWO Responsible Carrier Program
Pamphlet. The oil industry has made tremendous strides in the prevention of careless spill
events through education and safety campaigns directed at members of the petroleum
transportation community. However, substituting well- intentioned, voluntary safety
standards for statutory requirements in an industry with a dubious casualty history has been
criticized by many as short-signed and irresponsible. This premise inspired the environmen-
tal community to resist the notion that self-regulation was a viable means of implementing
industry-wide safety standards, and events such as the North Cape spill serve to illustrate the
fact that there are at least a few operators who have chosen not to comply with voluntary
safety programs such as the AWO Responsible Carriers Program. Id.
186. In fact, oil spill events due to tanker groundings or other marine casualties in the
United States have decreased in the last five years, but those reductions in spills have
occurred due to a number of factors. MARINEBOARD OFNAT' L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DOUBLE
HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 144
(1998). Factors responsible include: increased awareness of financial responsibility, and
state actions to increase and ensure transportation safety within state waters. Voluntary
industry compliance for heightened safety is not cited as a factor of reduction in spill events.
Id.
187. For example, Byline, Nation In Brief; Texas, Same Barge Causes Second Oil Spill,
L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1996, at 9. Buffalo Marine Service Inc., operated two barges that
dumped thousands of gallons of oil into the Houston Ship Channel and Galveston Bay. Both
vessels had buckled causing the holding tanks to rupture. Id. Countless other spills have
occurred from 1990-1997 in United State's waters, not to mention similar events outside
236
The Legacy of the North Cape Spill
through the state legislature provided compelling evidence that the persis-
tent protests of industry spokespeople were falling on deaf ears, at least in
the State of Rhode Island. 88
By the summer of 1996, passage of the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act was
imminent. Public sentiment continued to favor state-level action, and it
appeared that the Rhode Island proposal would survive the considerable
resistance of the industry, the U.S. Coast Guard, and even the Rhode Island
Department of Environmental Management (RIDEM).5 9 Other New
England states had also begun to express publicly the intention to legislate
in kind with Rhode Island, thus presenting the possibility that double hull,
manning, anchoring and other tug and barge safety requirements could be
legislated throughout the territorial waters of the New England states. 90
Against this backdrop of impending legislative action, the American
Waterways Operators, together with the U.S. Coast Guard First District
Office and the Massachusetts Maritime Academy, organized a towing
vessel and tank barge safety workshop in early June, 1996.191
U.S. waters including the tragic Empress spill, shortly after the North Cape. See
Proceedings of the Tank Barge/Towing Vessel Safety Workshop, Massachusetts Maritime
Academy, sponsored by the U.S. Coast Guard, Massachusetts Maritime Academy, American
Waterways Operators and the Northeast States, tab 11 (June 5-6, 1996).
188. See, e.g., such as Elizabeth Abbot and Christopher Rowland, North Cape Spill;
Tugs, Barges Face Few Regulations, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Jan. 28, 1996, at Al; Tom
Mooney, Three States Look for Ways to Stop Oil Spills, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Mar. 11,
1996, at B 1 (discussing the need for increased state-level regulations and characterizing the
tug and barge industry as under-regulated and unsafe); Mooney, supra note 158.
189. The rationale behindindustry resistance to the Rhode Island law has been discussed
in the body of this paper, and stems from obvious concerns regarding the economics of
retrofitting barges and the financial liability and negligence implications of stricter
regulation. However, the Coast Guard also publicly renounced the efforts of Rhode Island
to legislate in this area, on the basis that the area of vessel regulation was the exclusive realm
of the U.S. Coast Guard. The resistance of RIDEM to the Rhode Island law was a bit more
complicated, and was undoubtedly due in part to party politics in Rhode Island. See Tom
Mooney, Dozens Decry "Knee Jerk" Legislation on Oil Spills, PROVIDENCE J.-BUUL., Apr.
10, 1996, at Al.
190. I11
191. The workshop was held before the Rhode Island legislation had been enacted.
Although representatives of the Rhode Island Senate Fiscal and Policy Office were invited
to attend the conference, the event was orchestrated by the AWO and Coast Guard, and panel
members represented primarily industry interests. The topics of discussion at the workshop
did not directly address the contents of the Rhode Island bill as such, however discussion
topics mimicked the contents of the Rhode Island law very closely, including issues such as
manning of tank barges, anchoring systems, and double hulls. Representatives of state
governments from Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and Maine were all in attendance
at the meeting. See Proceedings of the Tank Barge/Towing Vessel Safety Workshop,
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The stated purpose of this conference was to identify effective safety
measures which could be implemented within the tug and barge industry,
and to "educate" state legislators from the New England states and New
York about the "flaws" in legislative proposals such as the Rhode Island
Oil Spill Act. 92 Proponents of the Rhode Island legislation viewed the
conference as an effort to derail public support for state-level regulatory
reform by establishing a Quality Action Team which would attempt to
substitute voluntary compliance with industry-supported safety standards
for state-level regulatory mandates.' 93
Approximately eighty-five percent of those in attendance at the
workshop represented either the oil industry, the tug and barge industry, or
the United States Coast Guard. 94 Not surprisingly, the recommendations
developed by the group called primarily for additional study and discussion
of all issues identified.' The outcome of the workshop was the creation
of a Regional Risk Assessment Quality Action Team, composed of
representatives of the Coast Guard, AWO, the environmental community,
and state governments.'96 The Regional Risk Assessment Team (RRAT)
was headed by a Steering Committee which included the Coast Guard, the
American Waterways Operators (representing the tug and barge industry),
RIDEM (representing state regulatory agencies), and Save the Bay (repre-
senting local environmental groups). 97
Although nothing in the charter for the Regional Risk Assessment
Team specifically addressed the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act,'98 participants
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, sponsored by the U. S. Coast Guard, Massachusetts
Maritime Academy, American Waterways Operators, and the Northeast States, tab 2, 3
(June 5-6 1996).
192. Id. at tab 2.
193. Interview with John Torgan, Narragansett Baykeeper for Save the Bay (June 5,
1996).
194. Proceedings, supra note 191, at tab 6.
195. Proceedings, supra note 191, at tab 18.
196. Lord, supra note 157.
197. The four individuals on the RRAT Steering Committee were Capt. Eric Williams
III, from the First Coast Guard District Office in Boston, MA; Ms. Linda O'Leary, Vice
President of the American Waterways Operators; Mr. John Torgan, Narragansett Baykeeper
for Save the Bay in Providence, RI; and Mr. Stephen Morin, head of the Emergency
Response Team for the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management. Supra
note 191 at tab 19.
198. According to its charter, the purpose of the RRAT was to: "identify the risks of
petroleum transportation in the New England/New York area and institute mechanisms and
derive measures to reduce those risks with a holistic approach that meets the needs of the
industry, state governments, environmental concerns and the public." Supra note 191, at tab
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in the process have expressed the opinion that the primary purpose of the
RRAT was to develop recommendations for regional towing vessel/tank
barge safety standards to be implemented in lieu of the Rhode Island oil
spill legislation, and which would preclude the development of similar
statutes in other New England states or New York.199 A newspaper report
which described the formation of the RRAT noted that, "it appeared clear
that the Coast Guard and industry experts are finally acting on safety issues
both because of the recent oil spills and their fears about the slew of new
legislation that they feel may impose expensive and unnecessary rules."200
The RRAT began meeting in September, 1996 and met periodically
throughout the fall.2 ' The objective of these meetings was to develop a
final report which would contain recommendations for safety standards to
be implemented within the framework of a specially regulated navigation
area (RNA). 2 The RNA would be created by a Coast Guard rule, and
would impose regional safety standards, implemented and enforced by the
Coast Guard, for all towing vessels and tank barges operating in New
England/New York coastal waters. 3 Industry and agency representatives
participating in the RRAT indicated, both during meetings and in state-
ments to the press, that the regulations developed by the RRAT and
implemented through the RNA should replace the Rhode Island regulations,
which by this time had been enacted as law.2'
5. An Overview of the Rhode Island Response
Rhode Island's legislative response to the North Cape incident is an
example of one state's determination to prevent vessel-source marine
20.
199. Interview with John Torgan, Narragansett Baykeeper for Save the Bay (Oct. 20,
1996).
200. Lord, supra note 157.
201. It is interesting to note that although the Regional Risk Assessment Team was
formed at the June workshop, the Steering Committee did not commence with meetings until
September 12, 1996, a few weeks after the Rhode Island legislation was signed into law.
According to at least one member of the Steering Committee for the RRAT, this time delay
was due to the fact that the contents of the Rhode Island legislation, as passed, were central
to the agenda developed for the RRAT meetings. Interview with John Torgan, Narragansett
Baykeeper for Save the Bay (Oct. 20, 1996).
202. L
203. Id.
204. See Lord, supra note 157.
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pollution incidents within state waters. Mobilized by the spill, the state
initiated an investigation into the causes of the tug and barge accident. The
Special Senate Commission investigating the spill determined that the
North Cape spill might have been prevented, had the vessels involved been
required by law to take certain, basic safety precautions. 5 The Commis-
sion members concluded that considerable gaps existed in the federal
regulatory scheme governing the towing vessels and tank barges responsi-
ble for transporting billions of gallons of oil through coastal waters
annually. The facts of the North Cape spill provided conclusive evidence
of this fact and served to accentuate the need for the state to legislate within
the window of opportunity and public support provided by this event.2"6
Inspired by the Rhode Island initiative, a "flurry of legislative activity"
ensued in other New England States.207 During the 1996 legislative session,
Connecticut0" and Massachusetts 2 9 both introduced oil spill prevention
205. For example, more careful voyage planning might have precluded the vessel from
ever leaving port. Likewise, the presence of a functional fire detection and suppression
system aboard the tug, coupled with a deployable anchor system on the barge, could have
interrupted the chain of events which led to the spill. See previous textual discussion of the
spill scenario. See also RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88, at 8-14.
206. Many of the requirements incorporated into the law, such as event reporting,
shipboard drills and training procedures, etc. were included in the law not as a reaction to
the circumstances surrounding the North Cape spill, but as a result of research conducted
by Special Commission staff members.
207. Kristin Thomas, Spill Response: Legislators Set Sights on Tank Barge Operators,
WORKBOAT, July/Aug., 1996, at 36.
208. The State of Connecticut General Assembly initially responded to the Rhode Island
oil spill with an aggressive bill entitled "An Act Concerning Pilotage and Safety Require-
ments for Certain Tank Vessels, Conn. Senate Bill bill no. 365, February, 1996." This bill
required that all tank barges transporting oil or petroleum liquids through state waters be
equipped with a double hull and a "redundant working ground tackle," of sufficient quality
to hold a fully-laden barge during a storm. The bill also required that all tank vessels
operating in state waters be equipped with an emergency response positioning beacon which
could transmit information regarding a vessel's position in case of a lost-barge emergency.
In addition to these navigational aids, the Connecticut bill required that tugs and barges be
equipped with fire suppression systems, and that no towing vessel or tank barge should
refuse the assistance of another vessel if the towing vessel or tank barge was in distress and
posed an imminent threat to the public health or safety due to the possibility of grounding,
sinking, or spilling oil. The provisions of this bill are similar in focus to those of the Rhode
Island OSPPCA, and are clearly related to the facts of the North Cape spill. The legislature
did not enact this bill, but ultimately passed an initiative calling for the formation of a
standing committee to evaluate the feasibility of developing state regulations for towing
vessels and tank barges operating in state waters. Conn. Substitute Senate Bill No. 365
(1996).
209. The Massachusetts legislature responded to the North Cape spill with a bill entitled
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bills targeting the coastal tug and tank barge industry.2" In addition to
these state proposals, three pieces of federal legislation were introduced
into the U.S. Congress by Representatives and Senators from Rhode Island,
seeking to strengthen federal regulations governing oil transportation. The
impact of Rhode Island's legislative response to the North Cape oil spill
soon would reach beyond the walls of the Rhode Island Statehouse.
B. The National Legislative Response
1. The "Reed-Kennedy" Bills
During the months following the spill, two proposals addressing tug
and barge safety standards were introduced into the House of Representa-
tives by Rhode Island's Congressional delegation.2 ' These so-called
"Reed-Kennedy" bills, which included the Towing Vessel Safety Act of
1996212 and the Barge Safety Act of 1996 (BSA),213 were characterized by
Representative Kennedy as "an important first step in preventing accidents
like the North Cape oil spill." '214
"An Act Establishing Safety Requirements forTank Barges, H.B. No. 5938, 180' Gen. Ct.
(Mass. 1996). The provisions of this bill are a clear reaction to the anchor, double hull and
tank barge manning issues raised by the North Cape spill. Governor William R. Weld
characterized the Massachusetts bill as "provid[ing] the coast and waters of Massachusetts
with enhanced protection by requiring barges transporting petroleum and other hazardous
materials to be manned and to have operating anchor systems." The Act read as follows:
Section 50 C. (a) A tank barge carrying oil or hazardous material in the waters of the
commonwealth for the purpose of discharging or receiving a cargo of any bulk
petroleum product in the commonwealth shall be:
(1) equipped with an operable anchor system, including
(a) an anchor that is suitable for a seagoing barge;
(b) an anchor chain; and
(c) a windlass; and
(2) manned.
(b) Subsection (a)(2) of this section shall not apply to a tank barge that
is equipped with a double hull.
Id.
210. Mooney, Mar. 11, 1996, supra note 188.
211. Jack Reed and Patrick Kennedy were Rhode Island's members to the House of
representatives and co-sponsored the above mentioned bills. Reed was subsequently elected
to the U.S. Senate in November 1996.
212. H.R. 4982, 104th Cong. (1996).
213. H.R. 3014, 104th Cong. (1996).
214. PatrickJ. Kennedy & Jack Reed, News release: Legislation Introduced to Establish
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The Towing Vessel Safety Act of 1996 was not a new proposal. The
1996 version of this bill represented the third time that towing vessel safety
legislation had been introduced into the U.S. Congress. Former Represen-
tative Gerry Studds, from neighboring Massachusetts, introduced bills in
both 1993 and 199425 which would have increased safety requirements for
towing vessels in U.S. waters. While the 1993 and 1994 bills were also
introduced in response to tug and barge casualties in U.S. waters,21 6 the
heightened public attention focused on tug and barge operations in the
wake of the North Cape spill217 provided yet another opportunity to
promote a stricter federal standard for towing vessel and tank barge safety.
In many respects, the Reed-Kennedy TVSA was identical to the version
introduced in 1994. Both contained equipment and licensing require-
ments.218 In addition, the 1996 TVSA contained expedited casualty
reporting requirements which raised the maximum penalty for not reporting
a marine casualty from $1,000 to $25,000.219 The 1996 TVSA also
directed the Secretary of Transportation to develop licensing requirements
for masters and mates of towing vessels, and required that all tugboats have
Regulations for Safety, Licensing, Inspecting of Tugboats (Jan. 31, 1996).
215. Towing Vessel Navigational Safety Act of 1993, H.R. 3282, 103d Cong. (1993);
Towing Vessel Navigational Safety Act of 1994, H.R. 4058, 103d Cong. (1994).
216. The 1993 initiative to introduce towing vessel safety legislation was a response to
two recent tug and barge casualties. The first occurred when a towing vessel pushing a
hopper barge in New Orleans, Louisiana, struck a bridge, causing the bridge to collapse and
kill a pregnant woman. The second casualty involved an Amtrak train accident near Mobile,
Alabama earlier that year where a towing vessel struck a railroad bridge. The bridge
collapsed from the impact of the collision, and shortly thereafter an AMTRAK passenger
train plunged off the bridge and into the water killing 47 people. After an unsuccessful
attempt to pass the towing vessel safety legislation in 1993, Congressman Studds
reintroduced similar legislation the following year. Again, the need for such legislation was
punctuated by a January, 1994 oil spill which occurred off the coast of Puerto Rico where
a barge broke away from its towing vessel twice during one tow, and ultimately grounded
on a coral reef, spilling 750,000 gallons of heavy oil onto six miles of pristine Caribbean
beaches. See Complaint of Metlife Capital v-M/VEmily S, 132 F.3d 818 (1st Cir. 1997).
217. See generally Dennis W. Nixon, Legislative Agenda-Building in the Wake of the
North Cape Oil Spill: The Critical Role of Initial Media Accounts and Witness Testimony,
COASTAL ZONE 97, Abstracts of Presentations 266 (1996).
218. John Mulligan, Reed, Kennedy Offer Bill Tightening Tugboat Rules, PROVIDENCE
J.-BULL., Feb. 1, 1996, at C3. The Reed-Kennedy Act, like the Studds legislation, required
that towing vessels be equipped with navigational equipment such as a functioning radar,
electronic position-fixing device, and a compass or swing meter. H.R. 4982, 104th Cong.,
§ 2(f)(1)(C) (1996).
219. H.R. 4982, 104th Cong., § 3(b) (1996).
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a licensed operator onboard.' Finally, the TVSA mandated that the Coast
Guard conduct inspections of towing vessels."2 Such inspections are
currently conducted by other members of the towing vessel industry.2'
On March 5, 1996, Representatives Kennedy and Reed introduced a
second bill into Congress which also responded to issues raised by the
North Cape spill. '  The Barge Safety Act of 1996'2 was intended to
complement the provisions of the Towing Vessel Safety Act, by instituting
safety measures for tank barges as well.' This bill targeted barges that
carry oil or hazardous materials through U.S. waters, requiring that all such
vessels be equipped with an operable anchor systen9 6 and be manned.7
The manning requirement in the BSA did not apply to double-hulled
barges. 2 In addition, the Act also directed the Secretary of Transportation
to issue regulations regarding dimensions for anchoring equipment and
training requirements for individuals manning tark barges.' 2
2. The Oil Spill Prevention and Response Improvement Act
Neither the Towing Vessel Safety Act nor the Barge Safety Act made
it through Congress as individually written. Both bills were absorbed by
the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Improvement Act,"0 introduced by
Senator Chafee, to amend the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The Oil Spill
Prevention and Response Improvement Act was, in turn, modified and then
incorporated into the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996. 1'
220. ME § 6 (1996).
221. Id. § 7 (1996).
222. Class "societies," such as the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), currently
conduct inspections of towing vessels; however, the ABS and other vessel class societies are
private organizations which conduct voluntary inspections, and which have no regulatory
authority.
223. See Tom Mooney, Precautionary Step: Reed, Kennedy Seek More Oil-Barge
Controls, PROViDENCEJ.-BULL, Mar. 2, 1996, at A3.
224. H.1L 3014, 104th Cong. (1996).
225 Mooney, supra note 223 at A3.
226. H.R. 3014, 10 4" Cong., § 2(a)(1) (1996).
227. Id. at § 2(a)(2).
228. Id. at 4 2(b).
229. Id. at § 2(c). It is interesting to n6te that the tank barge bill which was introduced
in the Massachusetts legislature is identical in wording to the Barge Safety Act introduced
into Congress by Kennedy and Reed.
230. S. 1730, 104th Cong. (1996).
231. Id.
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Senator Chafee, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, was no stranger to marine pollution issues. In 1990, he
stated:
Mr. President, with passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the
environment in which shippers of oil [operate] will change dramat-
ically ... I am very pleased that we are not waiting for another
World Prodigy,232 which next time ... may occur in the midst of a
winter storm, instead of on a sunny afternoon. This legislation will
help us prevent and respond more effectively to oil spills and
represents a major legislative achievement of this Congress.233
This statement, offered by Rhode Island Senator John Chafee in 1990 in
support of the Oil Pollution Act, is wrought with ironies which the Senator
could scarcely have imagined. Six and a half years after the World Prodigy
spill, "in the midst of a winter storm," the State of Rhode Island did indeed
experience a spill the size and impact of which has effectively eclipsed the
World Prodigy event. Less than six years after Congress passed the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, the tank barge North Cape grounded within direct
sight of Senator Chafee' s Rhode Island summer home.
While oil spill response and planning professionals generally agree that
OPA has improved the oil spill cleanup and response process in U.S.
waters,234 the North Cape oil spill provided compelling evidence that the
prevention standards established by the OPA have not precluded substan-
dard vessels from transporting significant quantities of oil or other hazard-
ous substances along the U.S. coastline. The OPA has been specifically
criticized for failing to regulate tank barges and towing vessels with the
same vigor as it regulates oil tankers.235 In the months following the North
Cape spill, environmentalists and residents of Rhode Island's coastal
232. On June 23, 1989, the Greek-flagged TV World Prodigy hit Brenton Reef and
spilled almost 300,000 gallons of home heating oil into the waters of Narragansett Bay,
Rhode Island. The World Prodigy was one of three spills in U.S. waters which occurred
during the same weekend in June, 1989. The cumulative effect of these three spills, which
occurred within months of the Exxon Valdez spill, helped to maintain the momentum in
Congress which ultimately led to the passage of OPA 90.
233. S. REP. No. 101-136 at 11536 (1990).
234. See generally NATIONALRESEARCH COUNCIL, DOuBLE HULLTANKER LEGISLATION:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 (1998).
235. Mooney, supra note 225, at A3.
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communities236 repeatedly charged that OPA did virtually nothing toprevent this and other tank barge spills from occurring in U.S. waters.237
a. Senator Chafee's Investigation
In light of Senator Chafee' s earlier remarks and the close proximity of
the spill to his own summer property, it is not surprising that he began his
own investigation, concurrent with the Rhode Island Senate legislative
hearing process, into improving the federal Oil Pollution Act. On February
14, 1996, Senator Chafee held a field hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee
on the Environment and Public Works in the Narragansett, RI, town hall,23 '
where Senator Chafee and his fellow Committee member Senator Joseph
Lieberman, from nearby Connecticut, convened three panels of experts.239
Panel members represented the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, the American Waterways Operators, the
University of Rhode Island, Save the Bay, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, among others.Y Senator Chafee's mission in conducting this
hearing was threefold: 1) to identify the causes of the North Cape oil spill;
2) to improve the ability to prevent future oil spills; and, 3) to strengthen
existing response policies."
Senator Chafee began the hearing emphasizing the connection between
a healthy environment and a healthy economy. 2 He suggested that the
committee seek to identify measures which would strengthen OPA and aid
236. During the months following the spill, Save the Bay, a non-profit environmental
group in Rhode Island with a membership of approximately 20,000 local citizens, held a
series of public meetings to discuss the impacts of and response to the North Cape spill.
Interview with John Torgan, Narragansett Baykeeper for Save the Bay (Feb. 14, 1996).
Several concerned residents expressed the feeling that they did not believe current oil spill
prevention laws and policies to be effective at preventing spills. Id.
237. Dennis- Nixon, Formal Testimony before the Rhode Island Special Senate
Commission investigating the North Cape Oil spill, Providence, RI, February 2, 1996. See
RHODE ISLAND SPECIAL SENATE COMM'N, supra note 88.
238. Tom Mooney, Community Grills Coast Guard Over Dely in New Safety Rules,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 15, 1996, at B1.
239. Id.
240. Kolo Kerest, Federal Hearing in Narragansett Seeks Answers From Oil Spill,
BLOCK ISLAND TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1996, at A7.
241. Oil Spill Prevention and Response ImprovementAct: Hearings on 1730 Before the
Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 104!' Cong. 1-4 (1996) (statement of Hon. John
Chafee, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island).
242. Id.
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in the prevention of future spills.2 43 Representative Jack Reed, also in
attendance, remarked that the North Cape spill had provided the Committee
with an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of OPA that the Committee
should take advantage of.2'
Vice Admiral Arthur E. Henn, Vice Commandant of the United States
Coast Guard, testified before the Senate Environmental and Public Works
Committee regarding the rulemaking record of the U.S. Coast Guard.245 In
an uncomfortable moment for the Vice Commandant, Senator Chafee asked
the Admiral why the Coast Guard was almost five years late in implement-
ing interim regulations2' for single-hulled tank vessels. 47  The Vice
Commandant promised that a new rule for safety standards for uninspected
towing vessels would be issued no later than the summer of 1996.248
The need for improvement in federal oil spill prevention policy was a
theme that recurred throughout the February field hearing.249 Additional
hearings were held in Washington, D.C. during the following months,
where testimony focused specific measures to improve OPA.250 Collec-
tively, these hearings resulted in the introduction of the Oil Spill Prevention
and Response Improvement Act, which directly addressed many of the
issues brought to light by the North Cape spill by attempting to supplement
the federal regulations governing towing vessels and tank barges."5'
b. The Specifics of OSPRIA
The purpose of the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Improvement
Act,252 as originally drafted, was to amend the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to
243. Id.
244. Oil Spill Prevention and Response Improvement Act: Hearings on 1730 Before the
Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 104"' Cong. 4-6 (1996) (statement of Hon. Jack
Reed, U.S. Representative from State of Rhode Island).
245. Kerest, supra note 240.
246. Mooney, supra note 238. OPA directed the Coast Guard to develop interim safety
measures for oil-carrying vessels by August, 1991. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. A final rule on navigational safety equipment for towing vessels was issued on
July 3, 1996. 14.2(a) codified at 33 C.F.R. § 164.70-.82 (1997). However, the Coast Guard
has not issued any rules, to date, on structural measures for improving towing vessel safety.
249. Mooney, supra note 238.
250. Patrick Crow, Spill Response, 94 OIL & GAS J. 33 (1996).
251. S. 1730, 104th Cong. (1996).
252. Id.
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enhance prevention and improve response to oil spills and to ensure that
citizens and communities affected by an oil spill receive prompt and full
compensation.253 The Improvement Act was organized into two titles; the
first addressed oil spill prevention measures,' and the second focused on
improving oil spill response capabilities. 5 This first title is relevant to
federal regulation of oil transportation.
Section 101 of Title I included interim safety measures for single-hull
tank vessels which are in excess of 5,000 gross tons, and concentrated on
ensuring a timely implementation of final operational and structural
rules. 6 It set deadlines of July 18, 1996 for the issuance of a final
operational rule, and December 18, 1996, for the issuance of a final
structural rule for single-hulled vessels.57 The language in S.1730 stated
that if the Secretary of Transportation did not issue these final rules within
the deadlines, the proposed rules for each of these measures would auto-
matically go into effect?55 This automatic trigger for the implementation
of proposed rules was an incentive to the Coast Guard to develop final rules
by the established deadlines. 9
Title I of S. 1730 also required single-hulled tank vessels to have either
a crew member and operable anchor on board the vessel or to have an
emergency barge retrieval system or some "other measure" providing
"comparable protection."2" While this ambiguous language was weaker
than the manning and anchor requirements found in the Rhode Island law,
it did address the issue of crew and anchors aboard single-hulled tank
vessels.26' Finally, the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Improvement Act
directed the Secretary of Transportation to consider, in issuing rules, not
only those measures which are determined to be cost-effective, but also
253. Telephone interview with Steve Odell, General Counsel for U.S. Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works (May 24, 1996).
254. S. 1730 at Title 1.
255. Id. at Title II.
256. Id. § 101.
257. Id. The deadline for operational measures has been satisfied, at least in part, with
the issuance of the Final Rule on navigational safety equipment for towing vessels issued
July 3, 1996. Codified at 33 C.FR. § 164.70-.82 (1997).
258. S. 1730, § 101(a).
259. Telephone interview with Steve Odell, General Counsel for U.S. Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works (May 24, 1996).
260. S. 1730, § 101(b).
261. Telephoneinterview with Steve Odell, General Counsel forU.S. Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works (May 24, 1996). Prior to the Improvement Act, there
existed no federal standards for crew and anchors on barges.
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measures which protect human safety, prevent collisions, and reduce oil
outflow after a collision has occurred.262 This directive showcases the
Congressional intent that the Coast Guard not base future tug and barge
safety rulemakings solely on economic feasibility.2 63
Section 102 of Title I of the OSPRIA created an incentive for shippers
to convert to double-hulled vessels. 2" The environmental protection
community responded favorably to this provision because it attempted to
accelerate the phase-in process for double hulls by providing liability
incentives for operators of double-hulled vessels.2 65  The OSPRIA ad-
dressed towing vessel safety issues by requiring the Secretary of Transpor-
tation to issue a final rule for interim safety measures for uninspected
towing vessels by September 30, 1996, and directing the Secretary to
consider requirements for fire-suppression equipment when drafting that
rule.266 Finally, the Chafee amendments called for additional studies and
research by the Secretary of Transportation and the Army Corps of
Engineers.267
262. S. 1730, § 101(b).
263. Telephone interview with Steve Odell, General Counsel for U.S. Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works (May 24, 1996). The Coast Guard is often criticized for
tending to weight economic considerations of the impact of proposed rules on the oil
transportation industry more heavily than environmental protection concerns. See Tammy
A. Alcock, Ecology Tankers and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A History of Efforts to
Require Double Hulls on Oil Tankers, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 97, 116-20 (1992).
264. S. 1730, § 102.
265. Id. Specifically, this section stated that shippers who operate double-hull vessels
were not subject to liability above the cap unless they engage in gross negligence or willful
misconduct. The liability cap cannot be pierced for operators of double hull tankers in cases
of violation of applicable safety, construction, or operating requirements. Id. § 102 (1-2).
266. Id. § 103.
267. Id. § 104. Specifically, the bill calls for the Secretary to direct a study regarding the
designation of shipping lanes for oil transportation as one method of reducing the risk of oil
spills to the coastal environment. The Army Corps of Engineers was also directed by
Congress to review the findings of a Rhode Island Commission studying the feasibility of
dredging the Providence River Channel, in order to identify whether such dredging would
reduce the level of tank barge traffic and thus reduce the threat of coastal oil spills in Rhode
Island. For the duration of the Rhode Island legislative response to the North Cape spill, the
dredging issue came up as a possible "solution." Proposals to dredge the Providence River
channel have been fiercely debated in the State of Rhode Island for over two decades. Due
to a high level of contamination in the sediments in Upper Narragansett Bay, the problems
associated with siting these toxic dredge spoils has repeatedly slowed the progress of
dredging projects. Proponents of dredging attempted to use the North Cape oil spill as
further evidence of the need to dredge, citing as a reason the fact that petroleum products
must come into Rhode Island via tug and barge because the channel depth is too shallow to
allow navigation of tankers. However, this argument has been countered by many who assert
The Legacy of the North Cape Spill
The provisions of the OSPRIA, though not as forceful as those in the
Rhode Island law,26 would have filled in many of the "gaps" in federal law
illuminated by the circumstances of the North Cape spill. Early drafts of
the Chafee amendments were extremely aggressive; one such draft con-
tained a provision which sped up the timetable for implementation of
double hull requirements for every month that the Coast Guard lagged
behind on issuing final rules for single-hulled vessels. Unfortunately, this
and other aggressive components of the OSPRIA were absent from the
version ultimately adopted by Congress.269 A significantly weakened
version of the Chafee OPA amendments was signed into law by President
Clinton in October of 1996 as part of the Coast Guard Authorization Act."'
3. An Overview of the Federal Response
The federal legislative response to the North Cape oil spill was initially
quite impressive. Between the provisions of the Reed-Kennedy towing
vessel and tank barge bills and the OPA improvements drafted by Senator
Chafee, many of the concerns of the Rhode Island legislature were ad-
dressed at the federal level. Had all three bills been adopted in their
original forms, towing vessels transiting all territorial waters, including
Rhode Island's, would be required to carry on board basic navigational
equipment as well as functional fire suppression equipment. Likewise,
adoption of the Barge Safety Act would have ensured that all tank barges
either carried crew aboard, or were equipped with double hulls, and that all
tank barges would carry operable anchors. Finally, the Chafee amend-
ments, as originally drafted, would have compelled the Coast Guard to
speed up the rulemaking process for interim safety measures for single-
hulled barges.
Unfortunately, rather than enacting each of the three bills as such, and
thus creating a greatly strengthened federal standard for vessel-source oil
that oil is transported along the Northeastern coast by tug and barge for purely economic
reasons, because they are cheaper to operate than tankers, and regardless of whether the
Upper Narragansett Bay is dredged to accommodate tankers, tug and barges will continue
to dominate oil transportation in the Northeast. See Mooney, Feb. 3, 1996, supra note 35.
268. For example, manning and anchor requirements in S. 1730 were weaker than the
Rhode Island OSPPCA, and S. 1730 offered incentives for double hull implementation, but
did not provide for a speed up of phase-in periods, as did the Rhode Island law.
269. Telephone interview with Steve Odell, General Counsel forU.S. Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works (May 24, 1996).
270. S. 1004, 104 Cong. (1996).
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spill prevention, these bills were fused and incorporated into the Coast
Guard Authorization Act of 1996. During this process, significant preven-
tion measures in each bill were removed."' The oil spill prevention
policies ultimately incorporated into the Coast Guard Authorization Act of
1996 were, in reality, quite minimal.
As Senator Chafee announced the adoption of the oil spill prevention
improvement measures in the Coast Guard Authorization Act, he stressed
that when Congress enacted OPA, they instructed the Coast Guard to issue
rules that would increase the level of safety on the single-hulled barges that
would continue to transit U.S. waters until their phase-out in 2015.272 He
stressed his expectation that the Coast Guard honor its commitment to meet
the implementation deadline for these interim safety measures by December
of 1996.273 Chafee also implied that while he realized the economic
implications of accelerating the double hull implementation schedule, he
still considered double hulls to be the preferred mechanism for preventing
vessel-source oil spills. 74 He stated that:
[O]n the prevention side... OPA can, and should, be strengthened
so that we can avoid having to respond to an oil spill at all. The
recent spills have only served to underscore the need for more
effective prevention measures .... Although the best way to
prevent spills from vessels is to equip them with double hulls, it is
quite expensive to build a new double-hull vessel or to retrofit a
single hull vessel with a second hull. 5
The Coast Guard Authorization Act (CGAA) included two major oil
spill prevention measures, borrowed from the Reed-Kennedy Bills and the
OSPRIA. The CGAA required that all tank vessels operating in U.S.
waters be equipped with either an operable anchor and a crew to deploy
it,"' or an emergency retrieval system with no crew aboard the barge, or
a "comparable measure" to protect against grounding of the barge. 8 This
271. Telephone interview with Steve Odell, General Counsel for U.S. Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works (May 24, 1996).




276. S. 1004, § 901(a)(1).
277. S. 1004, § 901(a)(2).
278. S. 1004, § 902(a)(3).
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language with its allowance for "comparable measures" was certainly
weaker than the manning and anchor requirements in the Rhode Island
legislation27 9 The CGAA also directed that "[t]he Secretary [of Transporta-
tion] shall require... the use of a fire suppression system or other mea-
sures to provide adequate assistance so that a fire on board a towing vessel
that is towing a non-self-propelled tank vessel can be suppressed under
reasonably foreseeable circumstances."2 '0 The federal legislative proposals
drafted in response to the North Cape oil spill were effectively reduced
from double-hull incentives and manning requirements to a requirement for
a fire suppression system and some method of barge retrieval. The
enactment of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996281 took a relatively
small step toward advancing the federal regulatory framework governing
tank vessel- source oil spill prevention.
IV. THE OUTCOME OF THE NORTH CAPE SPILL
A. Federal-State Interaction
The purpose of the Environment and Public Works Committee hearings
organized by Senator Chafee in the months following the North Cape spill
was to develop measures to strengthen the federal Oil Pollution Act to
address the concerns of his constituents in New England.8 2 The Rhode
Island Senate hearing process had highlighted the lack of federal regula-
tions governing the coastal tug and barge industry as a major contributing
factor to the causes of the North Cape spill. While the Rhode Island
legislature proceeded with an attempt to supplement the federal regulatory
scheme with stricter state law, Senator Chafee attempted to improve the
federal oil spill law in order to eradicate the need for individual state
action.
The Chafee amendments to the Oil Pollution Act and the Rhode Island
Oil Spill Act moved through the U.S. Congress and Rhode Island General
279 Retrieval systems may often be as simple as an extra tow line trailing off a barge
in a manner such that it may be accessed by another tug in an emergency situation. It is
difficult to imagine how such a mechanism could be considered as effective as an anchor in
slowing the progress of a runaway barge, especially since a retrieval device of any sort
requires the presence of another vessel to employ.
280. S. 1004, § 902(f(2).
281. S. 1004.
282 See preceding textual discussion.
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Assembly simultaneously. As the Rhode Island OSPPCA moved through
the General Assembly, members of the Rhode Island legislature closely
monitored the contents and progress of the Chafee amendments, realizing
that the fate of the federal bill would have a significant impact on the need
for enactment of the Rhode Island law.183 The Rhode Island Oil Spill Act
was enacted several weeks before the Chafee amendments to OPA, as
incorporated in the CGAA, were signed into law by President Clinton.
Although the OPA amendments originally drafted by Senator Chafee would
have addressed many of the same issues as the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act,
the anchoring and fire suppression provisions in the CGAA overlapped
only minimally with the 1996 Rhode Island law.2" The enactment of these
considerably weaker measures by U.S. Congress reinforced the sentiment
among many in Rhode Island that state legislative action had indeed been
the most effective course for adopting progressive oil spill prevention
measures.
285
In the intervening months between the North Cape spill and the
enactment of Rhode Island's new oil spill act, the Coast Guard issued a
long overdue final rule for navigational safety equipment on board towing
vessels.286 This new rule also overlapped to some degree with the Rhode
Island Oil Spill Act. Again, however, the Rhode Island law remained
stricter in several respects than the new federal standard. For instance, the
state law contained requirements for redundant compasses and VHF radios,
and for both working radar and GPS. 287 These requirements were more
283. Interview with Robert Bromley, Deputy Policy Advisor, Rhode Island Senate (Aug.
1996).
284. Although the CGAA and the Rhode Island law both contained manning, anchor,
and fire suppression system requirements, the OPA 90 improvement provisions do not
render the Rhode Island law completely redundant of federal standards. The fire suppression
system requirement in the federal act did supplant the need for a similar provision at the state
level, however the manning and anchor requirements in the Coast Guard Authorization Act
were still weaker than those in the Rhode Island law. See S. 1004, § 901(a)(1)(2). In Rhode
Island waters, all tank barges were now required to be manned with operable anchor systems,
while the federal government still allowed for the operation of unmanned barges with no
anchoring system, as long as they carried a retrieval device or "comparable measure."
Furthermore, the OPA amendments contained no incentives for implementation of double-
hulls, which is arguably the most effective spill prevention measure. See Alcock, supra note
264, for discussion of effectiveness of double hulls in preventing oil spills.
285. Interview with Robert Bromley, Deputy Policy Advisor, Rhode Island Senate (Aug.
1996).
286. 33 C.F.R. § 164 (1996).
287. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.5-23 (1996) (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § I, effective
June 30, 1997).
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comprehensive than the contents of the Coast Guard navigational equip-
ment rule.2 8
While this stricter safety standard for tug and barge operations in
Rhode Island state waters was generally applauded by environmentally
concerned citizens, fishermen, and many in the Rhode Island legislature,
other interests likewise persisted in their rejection of the Rhode Island Oil
Spill Act as an unconstitutional expression of state authority.289 This issue
remains open to wide interpretation. Proponents of the Rhode Island
legislative response hailed it as a fair and just expression of the concurrent
jurisdiction afforded to states by OPA.29 Despite the jurisdictional issues
raised by its critics, the State of Rhode Island now boasted the strictest anti-
oil pollution statute on the eastern seaboard, and held tug and barge
operators to a stricter safety standard than the federal government.
Although the OSPPCA was often characterized as unconstitutional or
inappropriate,29" ' the Rhode Island Oil Spill Act has not been challenged in
court. However, as the OSPPCA moved through the Rhode Island General
Assembly, and even after the bill was enacted as law, U.S. Coast Guard and
tug and barge industry representatives persisted in seeking out alternatives
to implementation of the Act.2" These attempts were criticized by environ-
mentalists as subtle efforts to avoid increased regulation by invoking stall
tactics such as advocating further study before instituting regulatory
reform.293 One such effort involved the formation of a Regional Risk
Assessment Team, to study the risks associated with petroleum transport
along the eastern seaboard. Ironically, the Risk Assessment Team findings
became the platform from which an even stronger Rhode Island law was
288. There are other examples of where the Rhode Island law, and others like it on the
West Coast are more stringent than federal standards, even with the recent amendments to
OPA and the issuance of Coast Guard rules for towing vessels and single-hulled tank barges.
289. See generallyFalvey, supra note 138.
290. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
291. See Linda O'Leary, Vice President of Operations for American Waterways
Operators, Statement before the Rhode Island Senate Committee on Judiciary, Providence,
R.I. (May 28, 1996).
292. Id.
293. A generally accepted stall tactic, with many industry groups who are fighting
increased regulation, is the call for additional research or study on an issue before
regulations are adopted. Although research should certainly play a large role in all policy
decision-making, environmentalists generally cite the fact that, with respect to such
structural improvements as double hulls or anchoring requirements, industry representatives
have historically called for more and more study. This tactic, as it pertains to double hulls,
has continued for 25 years. See generally Alcock, supra note 264.
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launched, and also contributed to a recent U.S. Coast Guard rulemaking
implementing the contents of the Coast Guard Authorization Act.
B. RRAT Revisited
As previously discussed, the American Waterways Operators lobbied
aggressively to convince Rhode Island state legislators to endorse the
RRAT recommendations and to allow these industry-supported initiatives
to replace the 1996 OSPPCA.2 4 Likewise, the RRAT Steering Committee
planned to submit a final draft of their recommendations to state legisla-
tures throughout New England in order to discourage other state govern-
ments from hastily implementing oil spill laws similar to Rhode Island's.295
However, RRAT participants from the New England state legislatures
and environmental groups held a slightly different view regarding the
RRAT recommendations. While these RRAT members continued to
participate in and support the Regional Risk Assessment process, they held
firm to the notion that the RRAT recommendations, implemented through
the RNA, should not act as a substitute for state-level regulations, but that
states should continue to legislate in a manner which would complement
and further strengthen the regulatory framework developed through the
RRAT.29 6 Mr. Phil Smith, Deputy Director of the Massachusetts Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs, expressed this view in the following
memorandum to the American Waterways Operators:
294. As unlikely as this may seem, Mr. Morin of the RIDEM had assured members of
the Steering Committee that Rhode Island would indeed sign off on the RRAT recommenda-
tions and accept them as a replacement for the new state law. Interview with John Torgan,
Narragansett Baykeeper for Save the Bay (Oct. 20, 1996).
295. Memoranda from Phil Smith, Deputy Director of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, to Linda O'Leary, American
Waterways Operators, at 1, 2 (May 13, 1997).
296. Implementation of an RNA would require federal rulemaking, a process which
generally requires at least one year from the time a proposed rule is issued to the time a final
rule is developed. Although RNA's exist throughout U.S. waters, they are generally very
small and specific in nature. The implementation of an RNA throughout the first district for
as broad a purpose as oil spill prevention would be a first, and members of the environmental
community have expressed concern regarding enforceability and likelihood of timely
implementation. See SARAH CHASIs ANDNINA SAMKOvrrCH, COMMENTS OFTHENATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL ONTHE SECOND DRAFt OFTHE REGIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT
TEAM'S FINAL REPORT, Submitted to the U.S. Coast Guard First District Office (Jan. 15,
1997).
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It appears... that perhaps you have misunderstood the distinction
between the Massachusetts legislative initiative and the Regional
Risk Assessment Team (RRAT) report and recommendations ... as
was repeatedly made clear... during the deliberations, the most
critical aspect of the RRAT's recommendations is the federal
rulemaking. Absent adoption of those recommendations the RRAT
is destined to become just another report to put on the bookshelf
similar to previous reports.... To date Massachusetts has seen no
indication.., the RRAT's recommendations will be implemented
by October 1, 1997. The demonstrated failure to meet previous
regulatory deadlines specified by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
does not inspire confidence that the latest deadline will be any
different.297
1. The RRAT Report and Recommendations
Despite the undercurrent of disagreement and debate among RRAT
participants, the Team produced a final report at the end of December,
1996.29' As promised, the report included recommendations for safety
standards to be implemented within a specially regulated navigation area
(RNA) for New England coastal waters and to be enforced by the U.S.
Coast Guard.2' The RRAT report addressed all of the major tug and barge
safety provisions present in the Rhode Island OSPPCA, offering specific
recommendations on each issue." ° The report also considered operational
safety and equipment standards which had not been addressed in the state
law.3"' Two of the major issues addressed in both the RRAT report and the
OSPPCA were tank barge crew requirements and barge anchoring and
retrieval systems. The RRAT concluded that since tank barges are subject
to Coast Guard inspection, they cannot be required to be manned unless the
Coast Guard inspector determines manning to be necessary for the protec-
tion of life, property, or the safe operation of the vessel.3" The team
297. Memoranda from Phil Smith, Deputy Director of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, to Linda O'Leary, American
Waterways Operators, at 1, 2 (May 13, 1997).
298. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD REG'L RISK AssEssMENT TEAM, EXECUTIVE




302. Interestingly, the Team found that a large percentage of barges operating in the
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identified and offered alternative practices and technologies that they felt
would offer equivalent protections to manning, including the requirement
for operable anchors and barge retrieval systems.0 3 The RRAT recom-
mended an anchoring and barge retrieval requirement similar to that in the
CGAA,3 4 and the Team also determined that different anchoring require-
ments should apply depending on whether a barge is manned.3" 5
The RRAT report also addressed voyage planning, and the RRAT
recommendations on this issue were virtually identical to the provisions in
the Rhode Island Act." 6 Both recommended that all barge companies
prepare comprehensive voyage plans prior to transit of New England
waters, including information on weather, vessel equipment, and communi-
cation and navigation requirements.3"7 The RRAT report also followed the
State of Rhode Island's lead on the issues of navigational safety equipment
aboard towing vessels.30 8 The RRAT advocated adoption and more
Northeast waters were already manned. The RRAT report acknowledged that approximately
70% of tank barges operating in the Northeast were currently operated with crew on board.
Approximately 10-15% of other barges were determined to be notched barges (barges
attached to the tow in a notch where the tow pushes the barge and a crew member can easily
board) or a tow/barge configuration at the hip where likewise a crew member can easily
board in an emergency. The remaining 5-10% of unmanned barges should be subject to
enhanced requirements for anchoring and barge retrieval systems as recommended later in
the report. The enhanced anchoring and retrieval regulations recommended consisted of
unmanned barges having an operable anchor system and a barge retrieval device with pickup
capability on the tug. See UNITED STATES COAST GUARD REG'L RISK ASSESSMENTTEAM,
supra note 300. Supporters of the Rhode Island legislation had consistently argued that
requiring safety measures (such as manned barges) that were already existing in most
instances was not unduly burdensome.
303. Id.
304. See previous textual discussion of the oil spill prevention components of the 1996
Coast Guard Authorization Act.
305. It was recommended that manned barges have an operable anchor system on the
barge and some means of retrieving a lost barge aboard the tug (for example, an extra tow
line). For unmanned barges, the safety recommendations included an operable anchor
aboard the barge as well as emergency retrieval devices on both the tug and barge. This
extra level of safety on unmanned barges was meant to compensate for the fact that no crew
would be aboard to deploy and anchor or catch a retrieval line.
306. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.5-22 (1996) (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective
June 30, 1997). The 1996 Rhode Island law contained a comprehensive voyage plan that
included information related to weather, vessel equipment, communication and navigation
requirements.
307. See id. and UNITED STATES COAST GUARD REG'L RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM, supra
note 298.
308. The 1996 Rhode Island law contained a requirement for fire suppression equipment
and basic navigational equipment, such as compasses and GPS aboard towing vessels. The
256
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extensive application of the Coast Guard final rule on navigation equip-
ment,"° and it also recommended requiring Differential Global Positioning
Systems on all towing vessels operating in Northeastern waters. 10
While many of the recommendations in the RRAT report mirrored the
contents of the 1996 Rhode Island law, the Risk Assessment Team also
made recommendations on operating procedures which were not addressed
in the OSPPCA. These include procedures for enhanced communications
aboard all commercial vessels traversing Long Island Sound or the territo-
rial waters of the New England states,3 ' operational safety measures to
reduce crew fatigue and human error,"' and lightering procedures for
fact that the North Cape spill resulted from an engine fire on the tug was the primary reason
for including a fire suppression system requirement in the R.I. law. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §
46-12.5-22 (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective June 30, 1997).
309. See 33 C.F.R. 164 (1996).
310. See UNrrED STATES COAST GUARD REGIONALRiSK ASSESSMENTTEAM, supra note
298, explaining the new Coast Guard rule which established navigation equipment
requirements for towing vessels, published in the Federal Register, July 3 1996. The rule
requires all vessels over 39.4 feet or 12 meters in length to have on board certain equipment
appropriate for their specific geographic regions of operation. Equipment required to be on
board includes marine radar equipment meeting the Federal Communications Commission
and Radio Technical Commissions for Maritime Services requirements; at least one VHF
radio as required by the Bridge-to- Bridge Radiotelephone Act; a searchlight capable of
illuminating objects at a distance of twice the length of the tow; current navigation charts;
magnetic compasses, a fathometer and for ocean going vessels an electronic fixing device
such as a LORAN C or Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. The rule also established
regulations for the selection, inspection, and maintenance of tow lines and terminal gear.
Also regulated are basic crew requirements for navigation underway including the assurance
that crew or operators are knowledgeable in the use of navigation equipment on board. It
also sets requirements for equipment inspections to be performed prior to a voyage longer
than twenty-four hours in duration or when a new master or operator assumes control of the
vessel. It is difficult to imagine that until this rule was published no Coast Guard
requirements for tugs an dtank barges such as compasses or navigation charts existed. See
33 C.F.R. § 164 (1996).
311. The RRAT recommended that all commercial vessels operating in those waters be
required to establish and maintain communications on VHF channels 13 or 16 with other
vessels traveling in the same geographic regions at certain identified reference points. See
UNrrED STATES COAST GUARD REG'L RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM, supra note 298.
312. The report called for operational safety measures which addressed the human factor
in spill prevention. The RRAT advocated that several practices be adopted by the tug and
barge industries operating in New England waters. These practices including familiarizing
management with a recent study on the role of fatigue in trucking accidents and keeping
them updated on new studies concerning the human factor in marine transportation
accidents. The report also advocated mandatory human factors and fatigue awareness
training for key personnel. See UNITED STATES COAST GUARD REG'L RISK ASSESSMENT
TEAM, supra note 298.
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vessels in coastal or harbor areas.313 Likewise, the RRAT report suggested
that certain environmentally sensitive areas be designated as exclusion
zones for all tank barge traffic, and that tug operators adopt practices for
increased security calls at the geographic regions specified within the
enhanced communication section of the RRAT report.3 14
The Regional Risk Assessment Team considered at length the issue of
tug escorts for single-hulled vessels.315 Industry representatives on the
RRAT, who strongly opposed expedited double hull requirements and tug
escort provisions in the Rhode Island law, maintained that a tugboat
equipped with two engines and two screws (propellers) 316 would provide a
comparable level of safety to tug escorts.317 The report suggested that tug
escorts should only be required for single-engine towing vessels with
petroleum-laden barges.3"' On the issue of double hulls, the RRAT report
maintained that any proposal to accelerate the retirement schedule for
existing single-hulled vessels could disrupt the "existing petroleum
transportation and distribution network in the New England states." '319 This
position, however, was not supported by the environmental community, and
comments on the RRAT report submitted by groups such as Save the Bay
and the Natural Resources Defense Council generally supported accelera-
tion of the double hull phase-in schedule in OPA 90.320
313. Lightering is the practice of unloading petroleum cargo from one vessel to another,
generally to a smaller vessel for transport to shoreside facilities. Again, lightering is an issue
which was not addressed in the 1996 Rhode Island law.
314. See UNrrEDSTATESCOAsTGUARD REG'LRISKASESSMENTTEAM, supra note 298.
315. The 1996 Rhode Island law required that as of January 1, 2001, all single-hulled
tank barges entering state waters must be accompanied by an escort tug. See R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 46-12.5-24(b) (repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 32, § 1, effective June 30, 1997).
316. A vessel with twin screws is generally more maneuverable than a vessel with a
single screw.
317. However, the RRAT did recognize that in certain situations or geographic areas,
single-screwed tugs could actually provide greater maneuverability. See UNITED STATES
COAST GUARD REG'L RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM, supra note 298.
318. Id.
319. See id.
320. See comment letter from John B. Torgan, Co-Chair, RRAT Steering Committee for
Environmental Organizations, to United States Coast Guard First District Office (Jan. 1997).
See also CHASIS & SANKOVITCH, supra note 296.
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C. Rhode Island Reconsiders: The 1997 Tank Vessel Safety Act
With the release of the RRAT final report, industry representatives on
the RRAT began an intense lobbying campaign to encourage the State of
Rhode Island to repeal the OSPPCA.32 Concurrently, Save the Bay
initiated their own efforts to circumvent a total repeal of the statute by
lobbying the Rhode Island state legislature to keep the 1996 law intact and
instead use the RRAT recommendations to supplement existing safety
provisions." Save the Bay articulated this position in their comments on
the RRAT final report:
[These recommendations] should not be implemented in lieu of
enforceable state laws. [The report] should, however, be regarded
as complementary to existing state and federal laws. There are
several reasons for this: ... The federal rulemaking process allows
for multiple opportunities for a proposed rule to be altered, delayed
or dismissed.... the existing recommendations are subject to be
changed at the Coast Guard's sole discretion... [and] [t]here is no
reason why state statutes, such as the existing Rhode Island laws
must be repealed in order to develop an RNA .... [I]t is our
position that state oil spill prevention statutes and regulations are
not preempted by federal law. Where they are necessary to protect
our valuable and fragile marine resources, state.laws are a legiti-
mate and appropriate means of achieving elevated levels of protec-
tion.Y
Despite these efforts, RRAT steering committee members continued to
work towards a repeal of the statute. In the spring of 1997, the RIDEM
drafted a replacement bill intended to repeal the 1996 law and submitted
this bill to the Rhode Island legislature.324 The RIDEM bill would have
replaced the tug escort, double hull, manning, anchoring, fire siippression,
and other safety standards enacted in 1996 with significantly weakened
321. See personal Communication with John Torgan, Baykeeper for Save the Bay (Jan.
15, 1997).
322. Id
323. See Torgan, supra note 320.
324. See Memoranda from John Torgan, Baykeeper for Save the Bay, to Rhode Island
Senator Charles Fogarty (Mar. 18, 1997) at 1, (Mr. Torgan references the RIDEM's
submission of 97-S 898 undertaken to repeal Rhode Island's General Laws 46-12.5 Chapter
290).
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anchoring provisions and other fairly innocuous requirements, with an
additional one year delay in implementation of these regulations.3"
Save the Bay again spoke out in opposition to the RIDEM replacement
bill:
As written, th[is] bill would substantially weaken oil spill protec-
tion for Rhode Island and offer no enforceable pollution prevention
provisions. Therefore Save the Bay will strenuously oppose its
passage as written.... RIDEM and industry representatives may
argue that federal initiatives such as those contained in the RRAT,
the Coast Guard Reauthorization Act of 1996, and the existing
provisions of OPA 90 will provide equivalent protection to the
Rhode Island statute. This is simply not true.326
At Save the Bay's request, Rhode Island's Senate leadership327 consented
to several meetings designed to improve the existing OSPPCA statute in "a
fair and prudent manner., 328 At these meetings, Save the Bay presented its
concerns and voiced objections to the RIDEM replacement bill.329 Based
on these objections, a new bill was drafted to replace the RIDEM bill.
The 1997 Tank Vessel Safety Act330 repealed the 1996 OSPPCA, but
unlike the RIDEM bill, combined elements of the 1996 Act with the RRAT
recommendations. In areas where the 1996 Rhode Island law contained
stronger protection measures than the RRAT recommendations, such as
double hull and event reporting requirements as well as drug and alcohol
policies, the 1997 Act retained the language from the original Rhode Island
statute.33' However, the 1997 Act adopted language similar to that in the
RRAT report on issues such as voyage planning, manning, navigation
325. R.I. S-898 (1997).
326. Memoranda from John Torgan, Baykeeper for Save the Bay, to Charles Fogarty,
Rhode Island Senator (Mar. 18, 1997) at 1.
327. Namely, Senator Charles Fogarty, who is a senior member of the Democratic
majority and Chairman of the Rhode Island Senate Committee on Judiciary.
328. Telephone Interview by Louise Kane with John Torgan, Narragansett Baykeeper
for Save the Bay ((Nov. 17, 1997).
329. See Torgan, supra note 326, at 1.
330. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.6-1 (1997). The Rhode Island Bill S-0898 was enacted in
July of 1997. This Bill repealed the 1996 Oil Spill Prevention and Control Act in its entirety
and was subsequently entitled the Tank Vessel Safety Act and placed under Title 46 of
Rhode Island's General laws entitled "Waters and Navigation."
331. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12-6.4, § 46-12,6-5, § 46-12.8 (1997).
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equipment, and tug escorts.332 Finally, the 1997 Act added to the 1996
statute by including provisions for enhanced communications, lightering
safety, and a Good Samaritan clause.333 In this way, the 1997 Act served
both to strengthen existing tug and barge safety standards in Rhode Island
waters, and perhaps more importantly, to demonstrate that the state was
willing to acknowledge and accept many of the RRAT recommendations,
but not to completely abandon the most aggressive components of the 1996
law.334
The 1997 Tank Vessel Safety Act was considered by Rhode Island
legislators to be an improvement over the 1996 OSPPCA.335 Vague and
potentially unenforceable terminology such as "limited visibility" was
removed from the original law by the 1997 amendment.336 Likewise, other
provisions were removed to prevent redundancy with provisions of federal
law.337 Under the new Act, single-hulled tank barges were now required to
be towed by tugs equipped with twin screws or engines, or if not, to use an
escort tug.338 In addition to workable anchors for manned barges, the new
Tank Vessel Safety Act also required redundant retrieval devices such as
extra tow lines.339 In contrast to the 1996 law, the 1997 amendments
allowed unmanned barges to transit state waters - but only when three
barge-retrieval devices were easily accessible on board the unmanned
barge.34 The Tank Vessel Act also included a Good Samaritan clause
preventing or limiting liability, except in instances of gross negligence, for
332. Id. §§ 46-12.6-9, 10, 12.
333. The Good Samaritan provision limits liability for vessels and individuals who come
to the aid of a barge or tank vessel in peril. See id § 46-12.3-8 (1997).
334. The incorporation of RRAT recommendations into the Rhode Island state law also
served the important purpose of demonstrating to the industry that the state was willing to
abide by industry suggestions. One major criticism of the 1996 OSPPCA was that it was
developed with very little industry input. This fact helps to explain why the law was treated
with such hostility from many industry representatives. By amending the R.I. law to reflect
industry input, Rhode Island legislators hoped to foster a more cooperative relationship
between the tug and barge industry and state legislators. Interview with John Torgan,
Narragansett Baykeeper (June 1997).
335. Jena L. Carter, Rhode Island Senate Brief, Tank Vessel Safety Act S-898 (May 22,
1997).
336. Id.
337. Id. The brief points out that the Chafee amendments to OPA adequately addressed
fire suppression systems and thus were not included in the 1997 version.
338. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.6-8(3) (1997).
339. Id. § 46-23.6-9.
340. Unmanned barges were required to have on board a workable anchor, extra tow
line, and a barge retrieval device with pick up capability. Id. § 46-12.6-9(b).
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vessel operators and owners rendering assistance to oil tankers and barges
in need of assistance.341
Finally, the Tank Vessel Safety Act included a "lifting provision,"
allowing for the repeal of applicable sections of the Rhode Island law if
and when the Coast Guard develops a rule or regulation comparable in
strength and content to existing provisions in the state law. 2 This provi-
sion was intended to prevent redundancy or overlap between state and
federal regulations in the event that the Coast Guard develops future
rulemakings addressing issues such as manning of tank barges, tug escorts,
or expedited double hull phase-in schedules. 43 The inclusion of a lifting
provision shows a certain measure of faith on the part of state legislators,
indicating a recognition of federal regulatory authority in this area, and
further indicating an expectation that the Coast Guard will continue to
develop tug and barge safety rules and eventually eliminate the need for
states to assume this role.
In June of 1997, the Rhode Island Tank Vessel Safety Act was signed
into law.' The enactment of these amendments to the highly controversial
1996 OSPPCA resolved many of the concerns regarding future industry
attempts to block implementation of the 1996 law. In the State of Rhode
Island, the legacy of the North Cape oil spill was a finely-tuned statute
which addressed environmental concerns by building upon safety recom-
mendations developed cooperatively with industry representatives.
D. Coast Guard Proposed Rule on Towing Vessel Safety
On October 6, 1997, the U.S. Coast Guard released a proposed rule for
towing vessels and tank barges which, if adopted in its current form, could
result in the preemption of at least two provisions in the Rhode Island Tank
Vessel Safety Act.' 4 The proposed rule concerns the barge retrieval and
anchoring requirements and the fire suppression system requirements
mandated by the Coast Guard Authorization Act.346 In developing the
341. Id. § 46-12.3-8.
342. Id. § 46-12.6-12.
343. Id.
344. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.6-1 (1997).
345. 62 Fed. Reg. 52,060 (1997) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 155, 46 C.F.R. pts. 25,
27, and 32) (proposed October 6, 1997).
346. The Coast Guard missed a Congressionally mandated deadline, as the Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 1996 required the rule to be in effect by October 1, 1997.
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proposed rule, the Coast Guard conducted an analysis of the operating
conditions in the coastal and open ocean tug and barge industry,' 47 and also
considered the recommendations of the RRAT and the Towing Safety
Advisory Committee (TSAC)Y8
In many respects, the October 1997 rulemaking went beyond the
specifications of the Coast Guard Authorization Act (CGAA). For exam-
ple, the proposed rule extended the barge retrieval and anchoring provisions
mandated by the CGAA to apply to both double and single hull vessels."49
The Coast Guard, acting on the advice of the TSAC, also addressed the
element of prevention as it relates to barge separation and retrieval. 350 As
a complement to the barge retrieval and anchor provisions, TSAC recom-
mended that the Coast Guard provide guidance on the issue of voyage
planning by developing a Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
(NVIC).35 ' The Coast Guard had already developed a NVIC on tow wire
maintenance, and the TSAC suggested that similar guidance on voyage
planning would help to prevent situations which could cause a tow line to
part or a barge to be lost.352 Likewise, the fire protection rules were
extended to apply to all towing vessels, rather than to just those towing
non-self-propelled tank vessels, as directed by the CGAA.353 The Coast
347. The rule explicitly excludes vessels operating in internal waters from these
standards, citing the semi-sheltered conditions and opportunity for quick haven as mitigating
factors in internal waters, allowing for less stringent safety regulations. See id. at 52,059.
348. The TSAC is an advisory panel consisting of representatives from the USCG and
the towing industry. The CGAA mandated that the Coast Guard develop this rule in
consultation with the TSAC. See iL at 52,058, 52,063.
349. The CGAA required the Coast Guard to develop safety measures for fire
suppression and anchoring and barge retrieval of single hull tank barges. The Coast Guard
determined that similar requirements for emergency towing apply to both single and double
hull vessels, and reasoned that to provide a reduced standard for double hull vessels would
be to "detract from the existing requirements of OPA 90." See 62 Fed. Reg., supra note 345,
at 52,059.
350. See id. at 52,060.
351. The Coast Guard reasoned that tow wire maintenance and voyage planning are key
factors to prevent tug and barge separation. These issues were addressed in the rulemaking
to complement the barge retrieval and anchoring provisions, with the intention that requiring
proper planning and tow wire maintenance would help to prevent lost barge situations. See
id. at 52,063.
352. See NVIC 5-92, Guidelines for Wire Rope Towing Hawsers, available through U.S.
Coast Guard. See also 62 Fed. Reg., supra note 345, at 52,063.
353. The Coast Guard states in the Oct. 6 proposed rule that engine room fires are a
persistent risk in the towing vessel industry, and that all such fires pose a potential threat to
maritime commerce, regardless of the type of vessel in tow. Likewise, by applying the
requirement to all towing vessels, operators would have more flexibility over the cargoes
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Guard also integrated crew training requirements into both parts of the
rulemaking, recognizing the prevalent role of human error in most marine
casualties." 4 Finally, the rulemaking considered the issue of fuel system
failure as it relates to towing vessel fires, and developed proposed regula-
tions for fuel system shutoff standards to complement other fire prevention
measures.
355
The fire suppression system requirements and related provisions in the
Coast Guard rulemaking resulted almost exclusively from the recommenda-
tions of the TSAC.356 The provisions in the proposed rule were designed
to accomplish three objectives: 1) to improve fire detection capabilities;
2) to improve the means for extinguishing engine fires; and, 3) to improve
fire fighting training for vessel crew. 357 The rule required that within two
years of the effective date, all towing vessels would be equipped with a
general alarm capable of alerting all vessel crew of a fire on board.358 The
proposed rule also required that within two years of the effective date, all
towing vessels have a fire detection system in the engine room capable of
detecting fires in the earliest stages, and that the vessels also have a
communication system in place between the engine room and the wheel-
house.359 The Coast Guard also proposed that all existing towing vessels,
within two years, be equipped with a fire pump and fire main as well as
portable fire extinguishers, and that remote engine shutdowns or fuel pump
shutoffs be installed in towing vessel engines. 3' New vessels would be
required to be constructed with these extra safety features, and additional
they may tow. See 62 Fed. Reg., supra note 345, at 52,059.
354. These include training and drill requirements and anti-fatigue policies which apply
to operators, management, and crew. See id. at 52,058.
355. The rulemaking refers several times to an analysis of towing vessel casualties which
occurred between 1992 and 1995. This study indicated that approximately 40% of all
towing vessel fires involved a fuel system failure, and took this statistic to indicated the need
to develop minimum standards for fuel systems on towing vessels. These minimum
requirements are comparable to those developed for the commercial fishing industry and
codified at 46 C.F.R. § 28.335. See id. at 52,062 (1997).
356. See id. at 52,060.
357. See id.
358. Id. at 52,061. Under the proposed rule, existing vessels would be able to choose
between an audible and visual alarm, and new vessels would be required to possess both
forms. See id.
359. Id. For new vessels, the communication system would have to be permanent,
however for existing vessels, this system could consist of portable radios or other non-
permanent means. See id.
360. Id. at 52,061-62.
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fuel system standards would also apply exclusively to new vessels. 361 The
proposed rule required that fire axes be located on board towing vessels,
and that vessel masters or owners develop fire fighting procedures and
training and orientation standards for all crew members.362
While the Coast Guard rulemaking expanded on the fire suppression
requirements specified in the Coast Guard Authorization Act, its contents
did not match the stringency of the Rhode Island law or the RRAT recom-
mendations for anchoring and barge retrieval requirements. While the
RRAT report recommended redundant retrieval devices on tank barges,
namely operable anchors as well as a barge retrieval system,363 the Coast
Guard rulemaking only required one type of retrieval device.3 4 Moreover,
the proposed rule specified that only manned barges were required to have
operable anchors on board, and that unmanned barges must only have an
extra tow wire or other comparable retrieval device on the tug in order to
be in compliance with federal law.36" By comparison, the Rhode Island
Tank Vessel Safety law required both an anchor and retrieval device for
manned barges, and for unmanned barges also required that a third,
redundant retrieval device be present on the tug.366
The Coast Guard's reason for relying on the less stringent barge
retrieval standard was to prevent loss of life on barges by removing the
possibility that a crewmember would be placed on a previously unmanned
barge to deploy an anchor during an emergency.367 However, this reasoning
is inconsistent with the facts of the North Cape incident, where despite high
seas and strong winds, crewmembers were successfully placed on the
unmanned barge and, had the anchor been in working condition, might have
361. Existing vessels were exempted from this requirement because of the mechanical
logistics and costs associated with altering existing fuel system configurations. See 62 Fed.
Reg., supra note 345, at 52,062.
362. Id.
363. See UNTrED STATES COAST GUARD REG'LRISKASSESSMENTTEAM, supra note 298.
An approved barge retrieval system might consist of an extra tow wire on the tug. See
previous textual discussion of RRAT report recommendations for retrieval systems, supra
Part IV.B.1.
364. 62 Fed. Reg., supra note 348, at 52,060. This lesser requirement is consistent with
the direction in section 901 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996. See Pub. L. No.
104-324, Title IX, § 901, 110 Stat. 3946 (1996) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.A. § 3719
(West Supp. 1998)).
365. See icL at 52,060. The Coast Guard chose not to require operable anchors
on unmanned barges because of unacceptable risk to mariners. Id.
366. R.I. G EN. LAWS § 46-12.6-9 (1997).
367. See 62 Fed. Reg., supra note 345, at 52,060.
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been able to deploy the anchor and prevent the casualty which resulted.368
In the North Cape, as in any such incident, the decision to deploy crew to
an unmanned barge lay with the vessel master. Protection of human life is
always the highest priority in any emergency, and most would argue that
the presence of a working anchor on a tank barge would not necessarily
precipitate a situation in which a vessel master would compromise the
safety of a crewmember.3 69 In addition to these human safety issues, the
Coast Guard rulemaking cited the "unwarranted costs on the industry"
associated with requiring both anchors and retrieval devices.37
In the federalism analysis which accompanied the proposed rule, the
Coast Guard made a fairly strong statement regarding the implications of
the proposed regulations for provisions in the Rhode Island law.37 ' The
rulemaking explicitly states that "when these rules are published as final
and go into effect, they may preempt certain provisions of the Rhode Island
State law, or other State laws, that differ from or exceed Coast Guard
regulations.""37 While this statement clearly implies that the anchoring
requirements and fire suppression equipment provisions in the Rhode
Island law373 shall be preempted by the finalized Coast Guard rule, the
lifting provision in the Rhode Island law would only apply if the Coast
Guard barge retrieval standard were comparable to the Rhode Island
requirements, which they are not.374 It is reasonable to assume that the
Coast Guard rule would have supremacy over the Rhode Island law, and
that if and when a final rule is issued, the rule will indeed cause portions of
the Rhode Island law to be preempted. However, an analysis of the non-
preemption clause in OPA could lead to a different conclusion altogether.
The legislative history of the Oil Pollution Act includes an intense
debate on the issue of preemption, which resulted in the inclusion of
explicit non-preemption language in the Act, preserving state regulatory
368. See previous textual discussion of the North Cape spill, supra Part I.A.
369. While it is impossible to predict the actions of individuals in an emergency
situation, Vessel Response Plans, which are the OPA 90-required contingency plans that all
U.S. tank vessels and oil facilities prepare and use as the basis for spill response planning,
always prioritize protection of human life during an emergency.
370. 62 Fed. Reg., supra note 345, at 52,063.
371. Id.at 52,066.
372. Id.
373. Gen. Laws § 46-12.6-12 (1997).
374. See previous textual discussion describing the lesser standard in the Coast Guard
proposed rule, supra p. 265.
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authority in the arena of oil pollution prevention.375 Because the contents
of the Coast Guard rulemaking result from an amendment to OPA, the issue
of preemption of state law by a coast Guard rule remains open to interpreta-
tion. While the rulemaking states that the Rhode Island anchor provisions,
which exceed the proposed rule, will be preempted by the impending Coast
Guard regulations, the non-preemption language in OPA 90 suggests that
these Rhode Island requirements could be interpreted as an expression of
the state's concurrent jurisdiction as provided by OPA. Because all vessels
which comply with the stricter Rhode Island provision would also be in
compliance with the new federal regulations, conflict preemption does not
necessarily apply.376 The federalism analysis in this case, then, may not be
as simple as the statement in the Coast Guard rulemaking implies, and may
instead require a more in-depth analysis of the blurred jurisdictional
boundaries between state and federal regulatory authority in the field of oil
spill prevention. Resolution of these broader issues may indeed be the final
component of the North Cape's considerable contribution to the field of oil
spill policy.3"
Several comments concerning the CoastGuard rule, submitted by the
January 5, 1998 closing date, indicate disappointment in the perceived
weakness of the proposed rules. Trudy Coxe, Secretary of Environmental
Affairs for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, wrote that she was
375. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718(a)(1)(a) (West Supp.1998). The non-preemption clause reads
as follows: "Nothing in this [Act] shall... affect, or be construed or interpreted as
preempting, the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any
additional liability or requirements with respect to... the discharge of oil .... " Id,
376. Generally, the existence of preemption in a given area of law is determined in one
of three ways. Preemption may be indicated by direct Congressional intent, by implied
intent ("fieldpreemption"), orthrough "conflictpreemption." The non-preemption language
in OPA precludes the possibility for explicit or implied preemption. Conflict preemption
occurs when state and federal laws conflict such that satisfying a state law could mean
violating a federal law. See generally Steven A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79
CORNELL L. REv. 767, 768-70 (1994).
377. One author has characterized oil pollution law as existing at the "crossroads of
environmental and maritime law." See Jean Cameron, Executive Director States/BC Oil
Spill Task Force, States and Provinces: Standing at the crossroads of environmental and
maritime law, presented to the Tanker Legislation Conference '95, Washington, D.C.
(September 1995). Environmental law and policy, as it has evolved in the United States,
delegates a great deal of authority to the states, and in fact often encourages the promulga-
tion of more stringent state standards. By contrast, maritime law is firmly rooted in the
principles of federal supremacy, to protect the "harmony and uniformity" of national
maritime law. See U.S. CONST. art. Im, § 2. Rhode Island's legislative response to the North
Cape spill provides a perfect illustration of the conflict between these opposing principals.
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"disappointed... that the proposed rules... do not, in most instances,
follow the recommendations of [RRAT]." '378 Coxe's principal objection
was that the proposed rule does not require all barges to be manned and
have an operable anchor system.379 John Torgan, Narragansett Baykeeper,
writing on behalf of the environmental organization Save the Bay, said the
"proposed rule... falls well short of the measures recommended by the
RRAT report, and is significantly weaker than the Rhode Island statute it
is designed to preempt."38 Torgan also identified the failure to require an
operable anchor system as one of his principal objections.38 '
The most critical comments, however, came from Sheldon Whitehouse,
the U.S. Attorney who led the successful criminal prosecution of Eklof
Marine.382 Whitehouse focused his comments on the fire suppression and
anchoring system sections of the proposed rule. He made the startling
observation that although the North Cape disaster was obviously the
inspiration for the regulatory effort, the proposed rule would not prevent
the same accident from occurring again. With regard to fire suppression,
he asserts that "the Scandia's fire suppression system, which was not
capable of suppressing an engine room fire, would have easily met the
requirements of the proposed regulations. 383 Why? The existing tug fleet
is exempt from the requirement for installation of a total flooding, or
"gaseous suppression system" in the engine room - where nearly all fires
originate. 4 With regard to anchoring systems, the proposed rule would
legitimize the status of the North Cape - an unmanned barge without an
operable anchor system. 385 It would be required to have only an "emer-
gency retrieval system '386 (an extra tow line), which would have made no
378. Letter from Trudy Coxe, Secretary of Environmental Affairs for the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, to Executive Secretary, Marine Safety Council, on CGD 97- 064, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 1 (Dec. 30, 1997) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law
Journal).
379. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Comments Submitted in Response to Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on Towing Vessel Safety (CG-97-064), id. at Attachment 1.
380. Letter from John Torgan, Save the Bay, to Executive Secretary, Marine Safety
Council on CGD 97-064, 1 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Jan. 5, 1998) (on file with the
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
381. Id. at 2.
382. Letter from Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Attorney, District of Rhode Island, to
Executive Secretary, Marine Safety Council, on CGD 97-064, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (Jan. 2, 1998) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
383. Id.
384. Id. at 5-6.
385. Id. at 7.
386. See id.
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difference under the facts of the North Cape disaster - the Scandia was on
fire, and there was no other vessel able to pick up the tow. Only an
operable anchor system had the potential to stop it under those circum-
stances. Whitehouse concludes his review of the Coast Guard's effort with
the following:
Most important, the regulations, if put into effect as drafted, would
create a standard of care inconsistent with and much lower than the
standard of care established by the criminal case. In the criminal
case, the defendants were charged with and admitted to being
negligent in failing to provide an adequate fire suppression system
on the tug Scandia and in failing to provide a working anchor
system on the unmanned barge North Cape. The regulations
require neither. In other words, the standard of care set by the
proposed regulations is so low that anyone who follows them to the
letter and does nothing more may still be guilty of criminal negli-
gence.387
V. CONCLUSION
The North Cape oil spill has been remarkable in many respects. As the
vessels drifted toward shore, the tug Scandia ablaze, the barge North Cape
plunging wildly in the building seas, the crew of Coast Guard Station Point
Judith performed a brilliant rescue of the Scandia crew in the January
blizzard. However, they were powerless to prevent the environmental
disaster to come. Over 828,000 gallons of fuel oil contaminated hundreds
of square miles of coastal waters as the North Cape ran aground and split
its tanks just off pristine Moonstone Beach. The enormous loss of wildlife
is still being calculated some two years after the spill. The long-term future
of the lobster population, with as many as 12 million crustaceans lost, is
uncertain. Over 600 private claimants still await their day in court.88
Much uncertainty remains, but the legacy of the North Cape as a galvaniz-
ing incident in the development of marine policy is becoming clear.
New environmental criminal law was made, as the owners of the
vessels admitted that the failure to have a fire suppression system aboard
the Scandia and a workable anchor system aboard the North Cape was
387. Id. at 9.
388. See Mooney and Malinowski, supra note 31.
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criminal negligence under the terms of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
Record criminal fines were paid, and will be used to acquire and restore
critical habitat along Rhode Island's south shore. As a requirement of
probation, the entire Eklof fleet of some forty vessels will now carry
substantially upgraded safety equipment or face another million dollar fine.
Shocked by the virtual vacuum of federal regulations over the tug and
barge industry, little Rhode Island led an effort to introduce basic safety
requirements for this industry. Rhode Island walked a narrow line - always
recognizing the supremacy of federal law, where it existed, but jealously
guarding the right of self-protection if the federal government failed to act.
Rhode Island is best described as a thin strip of land along the borders of
Narragansett Bay and Rhode Island Sound. The state's official seal is an
anchor. It was incomprehensible to this historic maritime community that
federal law allowed barges like the North Cape to traverse our waters
without one. Despite claims that any effort to regulate marine safety was
preempted by federal law, and despite threats that a state law might lead to
an oil embargo, Rhode Island passed one of the toughest barge safety laws
in the country.
Instead of embracing this call for safer operations, the tug and barge
industry actively lobbied for a repeal of the new law. The law was indeed
modified a year later, but remained one of the toughest in the nation. After
years of inaction, the Coast Guard finally developed its legislative mandate
and announced new proposed rules for towing vessel safety, but they
appear to have been heavily influenced by the industry voices of the
Towing Safety Advisory Committee. Incredibly, the new rules would al-
low the Scandia and North Cape disaster to occur today, as the rules do not
require an adequate fire suppression system or an operable anchor to be
onboard. It remains to be seen if the final Coast Guard rule will correct
these glaring inadequacies.
The real legacy of the North Cape oil spill is that the process of
creating a safer operational environment has begun.****
****Editor's Note: The Coast Guard recently announced that it was shifting its approach
from requiring only one of three emergency control systems, to requiring an operable
anchoring system on single-hull tank barges. 63 Fed. Reg. 71,756 (1988). Much like the
conclusion reached by the authors of this article, the Coast Guard determined that an
operable anchoring systems is an essential measure to reduce the chances of oil spills from
single-hull tank barges. Id. at 71,755.
